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Executive Summary

The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized
for two main failings: its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer
municipalities and provinces, and that its funds have not been spent in an efficient manner.
Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP) for an
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50
percent, and several draft Bills have been prepared.

There appears to be ample consensus that if the additional 10 percent in funding were to take
place, these funds should not be distributed following the same methodology used for the IRA
and that a new transfer mechanism should be put in place. Two general requirements for the new
transfers are often mentioned. First, the distribution of the additional funds would need to have a
much stronger equalization effect among LGUs. Second, the recipient LGUs would need to be
held accountable to use the funds to improve the performance of public services.
The new transfer so far has been called the ―Local Government Enhancement Fund‖ or LGEF.
We propose a more descriptive name for it -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure
Performance‖ or FEEP.

The design of the new transfer with 10 percent additional funding and separate from the IRA will
face four major challenges: (1) How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10
percent additional funding (2) How to apportion the additional funding among the different
groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays) (3) What formula to use for
the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs (4)
How to ensure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery
performance These four challenges are addressed in this paper.

2

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

First challenge: Origin and computation of the 10 percent additional funding

Two main options are explored: Using the same base as for the IRA, which is internal revenue
collection; or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands the IRA base to
include all collections by the Customs Office and Internal Revenue. Obviously, the 10 percent
equivalent increase in funding would be the same under both options. The potentially important
difference between these two approaches is how the two bases (internal revenue versus total
revenue) will perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their volatility. We find
that, although there is some evidence that the broader base (total revenues) exhibits a bit more
volatility over time, the differences are not too significant. Therefore, there is not a clear
preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.

Several other (less orthodox) options for obtaining the additional funding are also explored. First,
to freeze the funding of the IRA as of 2011, holding harmless all LGUs in the future years to the
same funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011, and utilizing the increases in nominal
pesos from the 40 percent formula for the IRA to finance and expand the FEEP. This would
mean that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA would increase over the years and it
would be an indirect way to reform the IRA. Second, to shift some of the resources currently
distributed through the National Government conditional transfers to the FEEP, in particular
special funds in the budgets of sectoral agencies (e.g., Agriculture) that may not be used or that
are inefficiently utilized. Third, to consider the introduction of negative transfers from better-off
LGUs to the FEEP fund. A good number of countries around the world finance their equalization
grants fully or partially with what is known ‗fraternal‘ systems (also known as Robin Hood
systems) of finance that demand transfers from the richer LGUs to compensate the poorer
LGUS.
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Second challenge: The vertical apportionment of the 10 percent additional funds among
provinces, cities, and municipalities
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to apportion the additional funding
among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays). In the
paper we explore several possibilities. One of the options considered is to modify the current
apportionment percentages used in the IRA by excluding the Barangays from the vertical
distribution and distributing their share proportionally to what the other subgroups of LGUs
have. Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23 percent of
the funds to provincial governments, 23 percent of the funds to the cities, 34 percent to the
municipalities, and 20 percent to the barangays. The proposal would produce shares of 28.75
percent for provinces and cities, and 42.50 percent for municipalities.

We consider a second option with the vertical distribution among provinces, cities and
municipalities being proportional to their respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those
fiscal gaps are estimated in this paper. The advantage of either approach is that they offer a
rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to some new rule that is again arbitrarily
derived. The apportionment percentages under this approach will become approximately 15
percent for provinces, 18 percent for cities, and 67 percent for municipalities.

Fundamentally this second approach is the only sound approach to the derivation of the vertical
distribution rule. However in the future ―true expenditure needs‖ of the different subgroups of
LGUs would have to be derived; in the paper we use a historical approximation to expenditure
needs and there is no reason to expect the two measures of expenditure needs to actually
coincide. In the paper we provide and simulate different methodologies to compute the
expenditure needs of LGUs

4
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Third challenge: What formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds

This section develops several approaches for distribution of the new available funds among local
governments within each subgroup of LGUs. That is, given the funds available separately for
provinces, cities, and municipalities, obtained in the previous step, the question then becomes
how to distribute among municipalities themselves, etc. There are two main conceptual
departures in what is being proposed from what is currently done under the IRA. Under the new
distribution rules: First, not all local governments would get funds; that is, a good number of
them would get zero. Second, the distribution of funds would be based on the quantification of
the ―fiscal gap‖ concept, which is defined as the difference between expenditure needs of a local
government and its fiscal capacity to raise revenues.

Before discussing and computing the concepts of fiscal gap, expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity, the paper presents a formula to distribute the funds in each subgroup of LGUs that is
similar but significantly improves upon the current formula used for the IRA (a weighted index
of population, land area, and equal shares). The improved weighted index introduces additional
factors to population and land area to better proxy the differences in expenditure needs. These
factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. We also
introduce an additional factor in the weighted index to account for the differences in fiscal
capacity across LGUs. Note that the new improved index eliminates the equal share factor
currently used in the IRA. However, under this expanded weighted index approach all LGUs still
receive some FEEP transfers. That is not the case with the fiscal gap approach that follows.

The core approach to the distribution of funds within each subgroup of LGUs consists of the
estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different methodologies available for the
estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and it implements with data for 2008 two
measures for the estimation of expenditure needs and also two measures for the estimation of
fiscal capacity.

Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines
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The simulations of the FEEP transfers are carried out with the different methodologies assuming
two different vertical allocation rules (across subgroups of LGUs). The first is a modified IRA
allocation rule (excluding Barangays)—and the results are reproduced in the first table below-and the second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each subgroup of LGUs
(provinces, cities and municipalities) —and the results are reproduced in the second table below.
Note that using the fiscal gap approach allows restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs
that have a positive fiscal gap (that is, where expenditure needs exceed fiscal capacity).
Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted IRA Vertical
Distribution Rule
(for 2008 in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(in million PhP)

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

0
2031.23
126.42
326.42
2.58

0
4445.48
576.52
1016.61
1.76

0
9068.76
315.71
669.30
2.12

15,376.74

15,376.74

22,730.83

Source: Own Calculations.

Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal
Gap Vertical Distribution Rule
(for 2008 in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(in million PhP)
Source: Own Calculations.

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

0
127.17
7.92
20.44
2.58

0
3,213.12
416.70
734.79
1.76

0
16,520.08
575.12
1,219.23
2.12

9,627.18

11,114.03

41,407.54
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Fourth challenge: Holding LGUs accountable to improve the performance of expenditures
The last section of the paper addresses the issue of how to make sure that the additional FEEP
funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using
ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposes to use ex-post
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The
carefully selected performance indicators would need to be measured independently from the
LGUs themselves and should be meaningful in mattering in a significant way in the quality of
life of LGU residents. The indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to
outcomes, given that the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes.
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance
would need to be read as differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver
improved performance in the set period, say after 2 or 3 years, would be followed by suspension
of half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance, for example three
more years, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to improve, or
fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explores the past experience in
the Philippines with performance indicators and the several possibilities there may be available,
the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work in the future.

Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines
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I. Introduction
The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units2 (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized
for two main failings.3 The first is its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the
poorer municipalities and provinces, especially vis-à-vis the fiscal standing of many ―rich‖ cities.
The second is the feeling that the IRA funds, to a large extent unconditional in their use by
LGUs, have not been spent in an efficient manner to improve the daily life of ordinary citizens
throughout the national territory.

Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP) for an
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50
percent. Though there is much less than full agreement on this expansion, the possibility of an
expansion in the funding is now being seriously considered by the executive and legislative
branches of government.

There appears to be ample consensus within the GoP that if the additional 10 percent in funding
were to take place, these funds should not be distributed following the same methodology used
for the IRA.4 Two general requirements for implementing the additional 10 percent funding, on
which there appears to be also wide consensus, are often mentioned.5 The first is that the
additional funds would need to have a much stronger equalization effect among LGUs, that is
mainly help the relatively poorer ones, than is the case now with6 the IRA.7 The second is that

2

These include provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. The latter are the equivalent of boroughs. The
relationships between the different LGUs and especially those of cities and municipalities with the barangays are
examined in several essays in Preschle and Sosmeña (2007).
3
See DILG (2009) for a recent assessment of the decentralization system in the Philippines.
4
See Pardo (2005), Brillantes (2005) and Guevara (2006, 2007) for good discussions of the problems associated
with the current design of the IRA and proposals for reform.
5
The draft Bill on the ―LGU Enhancement Fund‖---not an official name but how it has been referred to—provides
that the additional 10% of funds should be allocated according to the two criteria of equity and performance. Some
of the available drafts of the Bill include a concrete split of the 10% funds into 5% for equity adjustments and 5%
for performance.
6
Several proposals have been made for reforming the IRA. The most recent is by JICA(2008).
7
See Manasan and Chaterjee (2003) and World Bank (2010) for the existing and (apparently) growing inequality
and lack of economic convergence across geographical regions in the Philippines. A more recent assessment of the
impact of decentralization in the Philippines can be found in Brillantes et al. (2010).
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there should be a considerable increase in accountability for how the recipient LGUs use the
funds to improve the performance of public services.

These two general thrusts, greater equalization outcomes and improved service delivery
performance in the use of funds, are widely acknowledged desired goals also for the reform of
the IRA. However, at the present time, it does not appear that the reform of the IRA is politically
viable.
Thus, the design of the new transfer -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance‖
or FEEP--8 for 10 percent additional funding as separate from the IRA will have the advantage of
showing some –or most- of the way for how the IRA itself may be reformed at a future date
when it becomes more politically feasible. In addition, and as we explore below in more detail,
the FEEP can easily become a blueprint for the eventual reform of the IRA, if the IRA overall
allocation is frozen in a hold-harmless position for all LGU recipients in a base year, say 2011,
and annual nominal increments in the IRA funding are moved to the FEEP.9

The design of the FEEP faces four major challenges:

1. How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional
funding? In particular, should the base of the funding be internal revenue collections,
as in the case of the IRA, or something different? In this regard, one standing request
of the associations of LGUs has been to use total central government revenues for the
IRA. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different choices, and are
there other alternatives?
8

The proposals for this initiative have used in the past the title of the ― Local Government Enhancement Fund‖ or
LGEF. This report proposes the new more descriptive name of Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund or
FEEP for the transfers but we keep the LGEF in the title of the paper to avoid confusion.
9
One issue to take into account may be the proliferation of special funds in the intergovernmental finance system of
the Philippines. However, the FEEP will have very different features and objectives than other existing funds. The
Special Education Fund (SEF) was introduced in the Local Government Code of 2001 and earmarks the proceeds
from an additional 1% tax on real property to support school boards. See Manasan and Castel (2010) for a
discussion of issues related to the SEF. The Performance Challenge Fund (PCF) that is being created for LGUs will
have considerably smaller funding than the FEEP (P500 million), it will be dedicated to matching high impact
capital infrastructure projects, and it will follow a completely different approach to LGU performance. The PCF will
confer a ―Seal of Good Housekeeping‖ (SGH) to pre-qualifying local units focusing on the areas of administrative
good governance.
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2. How to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs
(provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays)? One possibility would be to use the
current apportionment percentages in the IRA. However, there is the widespread
perception that the initial arbitrariness of the IRA apportionment percentages is part
of the problem (causing the significant and increasing fiscal disparities among groups
of LGUs) and therefore hardly could be part of the solution. What other options are
available?
3. What formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs
in each particular group? Here there seems to be clear the consensus on the need to
improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions and based on a weighted
index of population, land area, and equal shares. What seems to be also clear is the
need for more accurate measurement of the expenditure needs of LGUs (than
provided by the population, area and equal shares in the IRA formula), and for the
inclusion of some measure of fiscal revenue capacity (currently entirely ignored in the
IRA formula).What new formulas and methodologies are feasible given current data
availability?
4. How to make sure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their
service delivery performance? As opposed to using ex-ante conditionality for the
additional funds (for example, where the money can be spent, what kind of inputs to
use, etc.), the goal would be to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs but
demand from them ex post, say after 3 years of receiving the additional funds, proof
of improved performance in a number of carefully selected indicators. These
indicators would need to be measured independently from the LGUs themselves and
would have to be meaningful in in a significant way in the quality of life of residents.
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, most
likely the improvements would need to be read as differentiated changes in those
indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the set period could be
followed by suspension of half of the available funding. After another round or period
of performance, for example three more years, the funding could be completely

10
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suspended, with continued failure to improve, or fully restored, with increased
performance.

These will be the four main challenges that will be addressed in a separate chapter of this report.
The last chapter concludes and summarizes the main policy options open to the GoP.

II. Defining the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional funding

Even though it is far from certain that the additional funding eventually approved for the FEEP
will be the equivalent of 10 percent extra on top of the 40 percent now dedicated to the IRA, 10 it
will be necessary to make an assumption on that amount to go forward with this study.
Therefore, henceforth we will assume that the additional funding will be of 10 additional
percentage points.

Having set that issue, the next question is what should be the source of the 10 percent additional
funding. From a political-economy perspective it will be important to disassociate as much as
possible the FEPP and its funding from the IRA so to mute legalist interpretations that since the
increment in funding is based on the IRA, so should be the distribution formula. That is, it will
be important to make it clear that the FEEP is not part of the IRA, since it pursues very different
objectives s with quite different means. There are several alternatives that can be explored to
determine the funding rule for the FEEP:

(a)

Using the same base as for the IRA.

A simple answer is to make use of the current arrangement under the IRA and to increase the
allotment from the current 40 percent of the IRA to 50 percent. This funding is based on
collections from the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Under the Code, the internal
revenue taxes-- or taxes collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue-- include all income taxes,
transfer taxes, excise taxes on domestic trade, VAT on domestic trade, other business taxes,
documentary stamp tax and other miscellaneous taxes. The advantages of this approach are
10

In our preliminary meetings other figures were mentioned including, for example, an additional funding of only 5
percent.

Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines

11

several. It is the simplest and it can use the ‗machinery‘ already in place for the distribution of
the IRA. It also would preserve certain revenue sources, such as customs revenues and fuel taxes,
for the central government. But this approach also presents several disadvantages. It links too
directly and explicitly the FEEP with the existing IRA and this can create problems down the
road when the formula for the distribution of funds will differ between the two. In addition, it
may not be the most responsive to the requests for additional funding from the associations of
LGUs which have also been requesting for some time the broadening of the IRA base to all
national tax revenues, including customs taxes and taxes on fuel.

(b)

Using an expanded base from central government total revenues.

This alternative would use a broader base, specifically all central government revenues—this
including customs taxes and fuel taxes, among others— to compute the 10 percent equivalent in
additional funding for the FEEP. We can call this base NTR, for national tax revenues. In
absolute terms for the base year this would mean the same exact revenues as in alternative (a).
Thus rather than adding 10 percentage points to the IRA computation, the same amount of funds
would be derived by multiplying national tax revenues (NTR) by some x percent. However, over
time the absolute amount in pesos could become different if that initial x percent is kept and the
national revenues (NTR) and internal revenues (NIRC) evolve differently. This approach would
have the advantage of partially fulfilling one standing request of the associations of LGUs to use
total central government revenues for the IRA. The possible disadvantages would include a
potential larger commitment of funds by the central government over time.

(c)

Other less conventional approaches to funding.

There are some other variations in the approach to funding that may be at least worth considering
as ways to address some existing problems with the IRA.

One possibility would be to freeze the funding of the IRA as of 2011, for example, holding
harmless all LGUs in the future years to the same funding in absolute numbers that they had in
2011 and utilizing the increases in nominal pesos from the 40 percent formula for the IRA to
finance and expand FEEP. This would mean that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA
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would increase over the years. In this way, the FEEP would become a good experiment for
signaling the way for the reform of the IRA from outside-in.

Since the IRA produces

unsatisfactory results in terms of equalization and performance accountability, significant
advances in those two fronts could take place with an expanding FEEP.

A second possibility would be to shift some of the resources currently distributed through the
National Government conditional transfers to the FEEP. In particular, there appear to be special
funds in the budgets of sectoral agencies (e.g., Agriculture) that are either unused or inefficiently
utilized.

A third possibility would be to consider the introduction of negative transfers from better-off
LGUs to the FEEP fund. A good number of countries around the world finance their equalization
grants fully or partially with what is known ‗fraternal‘ systems (also known as Robin Hood
systems) of finance. Here those LGUs which have a negative fiscal gap (defined as the difference
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity) are required to contribute to a centrally managed
equalization fund. In this sense, those LGUs have negative transfers. As explained in Section
Four below, there are several methodologies that can be used to estimate fiscal gaps for each
LGU. Introducing such a system in the Philippines would have the advantage of further
correcting the perceived inequities in the IRA; thus, it would be likely that rich cities and a few
other well-off LGUs would have to contribute negative transfers. This approach would have the
potential of significantly lowering the fiscal costs to the central government of introducing the
FEEP. On the disadvantage side, this approach would pretty much imply the reform of the IRA,
for, there is wide consensus, will be politically unviable. The introduction of a fraternal system
of finance, being new to the Philippines, may face strong opposition by LGUs that would be
potentially losers and end up being too divisive politically.

The two more feasible strategies for funding the FEEP would seem to be either (a) using the
same bases as for the IRA or (b) expanding the base to national total revenues. As we have seen,
both these approaches offer advantages and disadvantages. In the next paragraphs we look in
more detail at the properties of those two bases from a historical perspective. Even though option
(b) would include a wider revenue base, since it would include customs revenues and fuel taxes,
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it is not clear that it would be superior to the internal revenue base in (a) from all perspectives,
such as stability and predictability.
Figure 1
Taxation In Asia

In terms of revenue trends, customs taxes represent a declining revenue source in general
because it is quite likely that trade and tariff reforms in the future will continue to lower the level
and narrow the dispersion of tariff rates. This trend is illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of Asian
countries using IMF data for 1972-2005, where it can be seen that the share of customs taxes (the
largest component by far of taxes on international trade) has decreased vis-à-vis the shares of
income taxes and taxes on goods and services.11 The declining relative importance over time of
taxes on international trade is not an exclusive phenomenon for Asian countries but can be
observed in practically all regions of the world, as shown in Figure 2.

11

The data are from the IMF-GFS statistics and originally reported in Martinez-Vazquez (2010). Note that the
Philippines are not included in the group of Asian countries as the IMF-GFS data source does not carry information
for the Philippines.
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Figure 2
Taxation In Asia

But offsetting that expected declining trend in customs taxes we need to take into account the
increasing trends in other taxes collected at customs, which go well beyond the customs tariff
itself. The revenues collected by the Customs Administration include also the VAT and all
excises falling on imported commodities, not the least excises on fuel products. Clearly, revenues
from these sources (VAT and excises) collected by the Customs Administration can dwarf the
revenues coming from the import tariff. It is not infrequent to find in many developing countries
that approximately half of VAT revenues are collected by customs offices. And for excises, that
share can be even higher. As can be seen in Figure 1, the trend in Asian countries is for taxes on
goods and services to continue to increase their share in total tax revenues at the expense of
customs taxes and also income taxes.
The next question is, however, whether expanding the revenue base of the FEEP to national total
revenues would expose recipient LGUs to greater volatility and unpredictability than in the case
in which the internal revenue base were used. The issues of volatility and predictability, not only
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the total pool of resources, were in the minds of the designers of the IRA since the funds actually
distributed in any one year correspond to the internal revenue collections of the years back.
Table 1. Philippines: Variation in Total Central Government Revenues and Selected Tax
Revenues, 1990-2007

Total Revenue
Personal Income Tax
Corporate Income Tax
General Sales Tax
Excise Duties
Customs Duties

Standard
Deviation
1.5
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.6
1.0

Mean
16.5
2.2
2.6
1.8
2.5
3.6

Coefficient
of Variation
0.09
0.20
0.16
0.13
0.24
0.29

Minimum
14.4
1.5
1.8
1.5
1.5
2.4

Maximum
19.1
3.4
3.6
2.3
3.4
5.2

Source: Author's calculations based on the IMF GFS Data

Some components of the revenues collected by the Customs Administration, such as for
example, excise tax on fuels, can exhibit greater volatility than internal or domestically collected
taxes. This is the question examined in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 3-A and 3-B. While
Figure 3-A uses data from the International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics
(GFS), Figure 3-B uses from the Department of Finance; note that the breakdowns of the revenue
components are different in the two data bases and that in the case of the Department of Finance,
we have data through 2009 (as opposed to 2007 for the GFS data).

We can see that the two

measures of dispersion, the Standard Deviation and the Coefficient of Variation, for annual
revenue flows of individual revenue components for the period 1990-2007 are the largest for
Customs Duties. Even though, the Standard Deviation for Total Revenue is higher, once
normalized by the Mean Value, the Coefficient of Variation for Total Revenue is quite smaller
than the one of Customs Duties. Since the revenues from Customs Duties are likely highly
correlated with the General Sales Tax and Excise Duties collected at Customs, we could infer
that those revenues would also exhibit more volatility than ―internal revenues,‖ including the
revenues from the General Sales Tax and Excise Duties collected by the Internal Revenue
Department. For the petroleum tax a separate time series is not available. However, a large part
of this tax is collected upon importation and its revenues (and volatility) and incorporated in the
Excise Duties collected at Customs.
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In Figure 4 we show the time evolution of the two possible bases, Internal Revenues (NIRC)
versus Total Revenues (NTR). We can see that, independently of the total amounts, largely the
two series follow each other quite closely. The coefficient of variation for NTR is 0.103 and for
NIRC 0.092. Therefore, expanding the computation base for the FEEP to total national revenues
(from internal revenues used now for the IRA) will only slightly increase the overall volatility of
this transfer with some increased uncertainty and unpredictability for the recipient LGUs. This
additional factor should be taken into account in deciding the computational base of the FEEP.
Figure 4

III. Apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays)
In this section we want to address the vertical distribution of the FEEP among the four groups of
LGUs. To inform the discussion we will first review the vertical distribution formula for the
IRA. Next, we will discuss how different the vertical distribution of the FEEP should be and the
difficulties for arriving at a concrete answer.

Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23 percent of the
funds to provincial governments, 23 percent of the funds to the cities, 34 percent to the
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municipalities, and 20 percent to the barangays. This vertical distribution formula of the IRA
appears to have been the product of political compromise at the time of the law‘s approval in
parliament as opposed to any calculated weighing of the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of
the different groups of LGUs.

Of course, the choice of vertical distribution shares for the IRA has had important consequences
on the overall performance of that transfer. In particular, there is a widely shared perception that
the share of the overall funds assigned to municipalities has been insufficient and has caused
many municipalities to operate with grave fiscal conditions. The perception is also that
something similar, although probably not of the same intensity, can be said for the provinces,
many of which seem to be operating with significant difficulties too. On the contrary, it seems
like cities, and in particular the bigger and richer cities, have been enjoying funds beyond their
needs, even though there are smaller and relatively poorer cities that are not so well off. For the
barangays the general perception is that there are no alarming issues of financing and that overall
they are doing better than fine with the IRA.

We must note that the relative poor position of LGUs within each group reflects the fact that the
current IRA horizontal distribution formula may not capture well the expenditure needs of the
units and also the fact that it does not capture at all differences in tax or revenue capacity of the
units. However, what we are referring to in this section is to the fact that the current percent
shares would not seem to reflect the overall aggregate differences in expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity. As a result there appear to be many more municipalities and provinces in dire needs
that there are cities.12

Unfortunately, the statements above are conjectures based on field observations of different
stakeholders of the decentralization system in the Philippines as opposed to the results of hard
calculations. Even if there seems to be ample consensus on the empirical validity of those
conjectures, they are not more than that, conjectures.

12

And this does not mean that there are not cities in dire need. In fact many small cities appear also to have
significant fiscal difficulties.
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This is significant for the vertical allocation of the FEEP because without hard evidence on
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different LGUs we lack sound basis to recommend
any specific vertical allocation rule.

At this stage, there are two alternative ways to proceed. One approach, which we could call one
of ‗rough justice‘ would be to vertically allocate the FEEP only among those groups of LGUs
that seem to be in more dire fiscal situations: the municipalities and the provinces. Then, some
rule would need to be found to divide the FEEP between those two groups; for example twothirds for municipalities and one-third for the provinces, or 50-50, or something else. Again we
lack sound bases to propose a specific cut. The advantage of this approach would be its
simplicity and ease of applications. As disadvantages, it may be politically too divisive as there
are relatively poor and smaller cities that would be left out of the additional funds. Also
barangays may strongly object when the entire group is left out of any additional financing.

A second approach would be to devise transparent methodologies for estimating the differences
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (or fiscal gaps) for LGUs in each group. A couple
of such approaches are proposed in the next section of this report where we discuss the
horizontal distribution of the FEEP. Obtaining a fiscal gap for each unit allows us to aggregate
all the positive gaps (that is for those units for which the estimates of expenditure need exceed
the estimate of fiscal capacity) in each group. Thus, in theory it would seem like one could use
those aggregate estimates to redo the vertical distribution formula of the FEEP and possibly of
the IRA, sometime in the future). However, as we will see in the next section of the report, at this
stage the estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity will be conditional to the level of
resources available to each group of LGUs as a whole. This means that the estimates of fiscal
gaps we will be obtaining are not independent of the existing vertical distribution formula for the
IRA. Nevertheless, we expect that the information we will obtain from the computation of the
fiscal gaps for the units in each sub-group could be helpful in deciding on the direction for the
desirable reform of the vertical distribution formula of the IRA, and therefore for its application
to the FEEP. In the future, using the methodologies introduced in this paper, it will be possible to
develop estimates of the fiscal gap that are independent of the IRA distribution formula. That
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will require making normative decisions about standard expenditure needs, which are only the
prerogative of the Government.
IV. Alternative formula for the distribution of the additional funds to qualifying LGUs
The horizontal distribution formula for the IRA uses a weighted index approach with three
variables: population, land area, and equal sharing.

In the case of provinces, cities and

municipalities the weights are 50 percent for population, 25 percent for land area and 25 percent
for equal sharing. For the case of barangays, only two variables are used: population with a
weight of 60 percent and equal sharing with a weight of 40 percent.

Quite clearly the overall intent of the IRA is to work as a general allocation transfer to address a
supposedly large vertical imbalance for LGUs regarding their expenditure obligations and
autonomous revenue sources.13 In this sense, the IRA would appear to have performed
satisfactorily, even when there is not a good measure of expenditure needs by the different
groups of LGUs, and therefore a good measure of vertical imbalance.

Where there also appears to be considerable consensus is that the IRA has been defective in
addressing horizontal imbalances in expenditure needs and fiscal capacities both across groups of
LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) and within each of these groups.

A priori, the reasons for this failure to address horizontal imbalances are rather apparent.

Across groups of LGUs, the vertical share allocation, as we saw in the previous section, did not
take into account either aggregate expenditure needs or aggregate fiscal capacity of each group.

Within each group, the IRA horizontal allocation formula only partially takes into account the
expenditure needs of each unit within the group and completely ignores the fiscal capacity issue.
In particular, and leaving the choice of weights aside, the population and land area variables are
13

The vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the difference in fiscal gaps (expenditure needs minus fiscal capacity)
between the central government and the aggregate of sub-national governments. Usually the central government has
a negative fiscal gap (potential revenue exceeds expenditure need). The sub-national governments have a positive
gap (with expenditure needs exceeding their own revenue capacity). The vertical imbalance is thus closed by using
transfers from the central to sub-national governments.
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likely able to capture differences in expenditure needs but not all the relevant differences. For
example, different population groups, such as the very young, the elderly or the poor imply
different needs than the regular adult population. There may also be differences in the unit costs
for the delivery of different services because of geography (mountain, isolated islands, etc.) or
population density or proximity conditions.

In addition the equal sharing is less likely to reflect expenditure need differences. The use of this
variable in the formula may be justified because of the fixed costs of operating a government unit
given that smaller units are not able to capture economies of scale in the operation of services.
However, this type of variable tends to benefit smaller units in an exaggerated way, especially
when the weight attached to this variable is relatively large, and at the same time tends to provide
a perverse incentive against jurisdictional consolidation if not a further incentive toward further
jurisdictional fragmentation.

Perhaps because of those reasons explained above, the IRA has failed to equalize enough within
each group of LGUs. That is, there is also a generalized perception that even in the group that
appears to be best off, the cities, there are units that are struggling to meet their demands for
services (smaller and more geographically distant cities), while there are other units (large cities)
that would seem to be much better off and with very substantial reserves of funds that even
overwhelm in size any IRA allocations.

Therefore, it would seem to be clear that if the FEEP is to achieve greater equity across LGUs,
the current IRA horizontal distribution formula cannot be used for the allocation of its additional
funds.

To advance in the direction of a more equitable distribution of funds there is a need to meet two
main requirements: first, an improved measurement or approximation to the expenditure needs
of each LGU; second, the incorporation of some measurement (or approximation) of the fiscal
capacity of each LGU.
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The theory and best international practices in the design of equalization grants should be of help
if defining those two elements, expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, in the design of the
horizontal distribution formula for the FEEP. Therefore, in the following paragraphs we will
review the different options available for quantifying expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and
how those measures may be put together into a formula. Finally in this section, we will present
some preliminary numerical simulations using available data to quantify expenditure needs and
fiscal capacity and for implementing the several options of the FEEP horizontal distribution
formula.

But before we discuss the approaches to measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity to
compute the fiscal gap for each local unit, we discuss a minimum first approach which is
basically a weighted index approach.

Simpler approach--Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA

This is the approach currently used for the IRA. The difference will be that in the proposed
approach we will include an additional variable for better approximating expenditure needs and
we will also include as an additional variable which is a proxy for fiscal capacity. However, it
must be noted that this approach falls short of computing a fiscal gap for each local unit and
therefore it will not do more than just distributing the pool of available funds by formula. But
yes, the distribution of funds will be more equalizing because it does take into account
differences in fiscal capacity and it provides better bases to approximate expenditure needs. Even
though we will present only one index formula applicable to the three subgroups of LGUs
(Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities), conceivably a separate index could be used for each
subgroup. This is so because the factors included in the index try to approximate the
fundamentals behind expenditure needs for each subgroup. Since the expenditure responsibilities
and therefore the expenditure needs of each subgroup can differ, the factors capturing those
needs could also differ.
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The extended index approach could look like follows: 14
AIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3 (YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)
+ λ4 (OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) + λ6 (RFCi)

Actual FEEP transfer to local unit i = FEEPi

= AIi x Total pool of funds available for the

FEEP transfer in each subgroup of LGUs (Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)15
where,
AIi

: allocation index (or participation share in the pool of funds, in percentage terms)
for jurisdiction i in the total pool available for transfers for each subgroup

Popi/ΣPopi : share of population for jurisdiction i in the total population computed for each
subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
Areai/ΣAreai : share of urban area for jurisdiction i in the total area for each subgroup
Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi: share of population under 5 years of age for jurisdiction i in the
total population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
OldPopi/ΣOldPopi: share of population over 65 years of age for jurisdiction i in the total
population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi: share of population living in poverty for jurisdiction i in the total
population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
RFCi (Relative Fiscal Capacityi) = [Max FC - FCi] / Σ [Max FC – Average FC]

14

It should be clear that the contribution here is the proposition of an expanded index formula that is more allencompassing of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The actual additional factors included should be treated at
this stage more like an example of what can be done than a firm proposal of how a final index formula would look.
Other factors may be included as relevant and for which we can obtain objective reliable data. One set of factors not
captured in the index formula but which may be quite relevant are those measuring cost differences across
jurisdictions in the provision of public services.
15
As mentioned, the barangays are not included in the discussion. However if they were to be included, the
expanded formula here could be adapted to the information available for barangays, as is now the case in the IRA
transfer.
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Where ‗Fiscal Capacity‘ is being measured as indicated in the next sub-section of the report,
and where
λ1 …… λ6 : relative weights for each of the factors in the formula
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, and
Σ AIi = 1
Two sets of decisions are important to make this approach operational. First, we need to decide
what the proper values of the weights are for each of the factors in the formula. Second we need
to decide how the pool of available funds for the FEEP will be divided among the subgroups of t
LGUs. And unfortunately, there are no clear exact objective criteria that can guide us through
either of these choices.
The selection of the weight factors (λ1, λ2, etc.) involves both technical and inescapably politicaljudgmental elements. Expert technical analysis within the Philippines from those that intimately
know LGU budgets must be used to gauge the relative importance of population, land area, and
so on in the determination of expenditure needs.16 Note that the factors approximating
expenditure needs are those from 1 to 5.17 In the same manner, technical expertise should be used
in assessing the impact of fiscal capacity in the relative position (truly, the fiscal gap) for the
different LGUs. This is approximated with factor 6. And naturally the stronger weight we give to
fiscal capacity the smaller the aggregate weight we will give to expenditure needs. This follows
clearly from the condition that λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1and so that λ6 = 1- (λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 +
λ5).

16

See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the potential rationales behind the weight factors.
Of course, other factors could be included and even some could be excluded. Here we are just using best
judgment based on international practice and what are the current data constraints. The variable measuring relative
poverty PovPopi/ΣPovPopi is taken here to approximate certain forms of expenditure needs. However, this variable
could also be taken to capture some elements of fiscal capacity, but this is not being done here. Fiscal capacity is
being measured independently through the RFC variable.
17
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For the purpose of the numerical simulations here we will assume the following values for the
weights, but obviously these values are subject to revision and sensitivity analysis:
λ1 = 0.35
λ2 = 0.10
λ3 = 0.10
λ4 = 0.10
λ5 = 0.10
λ6 = 0.25
Regarding the partition of the available FEEP funds among the different subgroups of LGUs,
there is no clear objective way to do it without computing fiscal gaps for the local units. At this
stage there are several options that are available: (a) use the same vertical apportionment as in
the IRA; (b) exclude the barangays and divide the available funds between the other three
subgroups, and here the options are multiple of course; (c) exclude also the cities as a subgroup
and use the FEEP funds only for the subgroups of LGUs that are widely acknowledged to be in
most need; but again the options on how to apportion the funds among the provinces and
municipalities are many. Of course, the consequences of selecting one vertical apportionment
rule or another are of much consequence. Here, and just for illustration purposes, we will assume
that the rule applied is (b) and where we just apportion the 20 percent of the barangays in the
IRA proportionally (as in the IRA) to the other three subgroups so that we end up with 28.75
percent of the funds going to the provinces, 28.75 percent of the funds going to the cities, and
42.50 percent of the funds going to the municipalities.

Using the most recent data available for 2008, the summary statistics for the FEEP transfers to
three subgroups of LGUs are shown in Table 2, where we use the adjusted weighted index
formula for the horizontal distribution within each group and the adjusted IRA vertical
distribution, as discussed above to apportion the available funds between the three subgroups.
For the pool of FEEP funds to be distributed (in 2008) we use the figure of PhP 53,484.3 million

26

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

for an IRA pool of funds PhP 213,937.2 million. An example of the necessary computations is
shown in Appendix 4 for the case of (some) provinces.18

Table 2. Per capita FEEP Transfers under Adjusted Weighted Index Horizontal
Distribution Formula and Adjusted IRA Vertical Distribution Rule
(simulated for 2008 and in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(in million PhP)

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

140.21
704.98
288.94
117.22
0.41

258.26
1,179.76
648.14
235.74
0.36

219.75
19,507.67
540.07
579.02
1.07

15,376.74

15,376. 74

22,730.83

Source: Own Calculations.

Distributing the FEEP funds on the basis of estimated fiscal gaps of LGUs
What we propose in this section is a different approach which represents a significant departure
from the index approach used in the IRA. This alternative approach is based on the estimation
for each LGU of a fiscal gap as the difference between its expenditure needs (arising from the
current assignment of expenditure responsibilities) and its fiscal capacity (based on own
revenues and also all received transfers and revenue sharing).
Fiscal Gapi = Expenditure Needsi – Fiscal Capacityi
The definition and computation of Expenditure Needs and Fiscal Capacity is addressed
immediately below, but before we get into those details we will review first how the Fiscal Gap
measures will be used. Note that Fiscal Capacity will be measuring all the ―Potential Available
Resources‖ to the local unit other than the specific transfer we are trying to determine or

18

Note that the maximum value for the municipalities is an outlier due to the current data for Kalayaan municipality,
which belongs to the province of Palawan (Region IV-B). This municipality, which appears to be a tourist resort, is
reported to have a population of 53 but relatively large revenues and expenditures.
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distribute, so it will include the ―Own Fiscal Capacity‖ coming from own taxes and fees and
include as well any shared revenues and all transfers, including the IRA.

Definition and uses of the fiscal gap.
First, the expression for the Fiscal Gap needs to be estimated for each LGU in each of the three
groups of LGUs: Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities.

For every local unit (within each subgroup) that does not have a positive fiscal gap (FGi <0), we
set FGi=0.
In this form we will be able to define an aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup
Σ Fiscal Gapi for (Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
It is important to note that we are estimating an aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup and that
even though they all are measured in PhP, the aggregates for the subgroups are not necessarily
comparable because the processes used to estimate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are
conditional on the existing data and the averages for each group. What this means is that
necessarily there would be some LGUs in each subgroup with positive fiscal gaps, thus
indicating a need for additional financing, when it may be possible that in some normative
absolute terms all or most LGUs in one subgroup can be in better financial positions than all or
most LGUs in another subgroup. As we will see, the methodologies discussed below can provide
the basis for those normative comparisons, but clearly, this report will not introduce any
normative absolute standards for LGUs.

Nevertheless the aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup of LGUs will tell a story about the
number of LGUs in each group that appear to be in a deficit (or positive fiscal gap) situation and
what this total amount is. So, in principle those aggregate amounts can help to inform changes in
the apportionment of the available funds in the FEEP across provinces, cities, and municipalities.
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Using the fiscal gap as a distribution formula.
In addition (or alternatively) the aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup can be used to distribute
the funds from the FEEP if we are willing to accept a vertical distribution of these funds as used
currently in the IRA or other vertical apportionments discussed in the previous section. To see
how this would work, we would proceed in two steps for each subgroup of LGUs:

(a) Define Relative Fiscal Gap
The relative fiscal gap is the relative size of each locality‘s fiscal gap as a share of the aggregate
fiscal gaps of all localities:
Relative Fiscal Gapi = Fiscal Gap i / Σ Fiscal Gap j

(b) Assign Equalization Transfer
Define the equalization transfer to local government i as:
FEEP Transfer to Locality i = Relative Fiscal Gap i * Part of FEEP funds for the subgroup of
LGUs.19

Notice that differently from the extended index approach discussed above, using the fiscal gap
approach will not produce a FEEP transfer for each local unit in the group. Instead, only those
local units with a positive fiscal gap would be a recipient of the FEEP funds. This will have the
obvious advantage of being more equalizing since only those units that cannot cover their
expenditure needs with the available resources would get the grant.

For illustration purposes we will assume that the vertical distribution rule for the FEEP is the
same as the one used above to illustrate the working of the extended index approach, so that
28.75 percent of the FEEP funds go to the provinces, 28.75 percent go to the cities, and 42.50
percent go to the municipalities. These simulations are shown further down after the review and
application of the methodologies to compute expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
19

Instead of a proportional approach, we could use a minimax approach to the final allocation of transfers. With this
approach we should imagine local units in each subgroup sorted in ascending order by the size of their fiscal
disparities. The idea would be to start ―from the bottom‖, allocating transfers first to those local units with the
largest fiscal gap and then moving up the ranks. We would exhaust the pool of available FEEP funds so that the last
local unit receiving the grant funds would report a fiscal gap exactly equal to all those below. Note that not all those
local units with a positive fiscal gap may receive funds under this approach to apportioning the available funds.
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Measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
In practice there are a handful of methods that can be used to estimate expenditure needs.
Something similar holds for fiscal capacity. These methods used in the international practice are
summarized in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, respectively. Here we will discuss and attempt to
apply two of each

Approaches to estimating expenditure needs
Below we review two possible approaches to estimate the expenditure needs of LGUs.

Estimation of expenditure needs using per client expenditure norms (EN1)
The essence of this methodology is to determine for each significant functional service of the
LGU a financial standard or norm per client or user of the service (for example, if the local
government were responsible for elementary education, how many PhP per year would be
allocated for each elementary school student in the Philippines; this amount could be adjusted up
or down with a cost index for delivering this service).20 This is essentially informed by practice
but also normative budgeting approach in which the authorities establishing budget priorities
determine how much is desirable and affordable to spend on different services. As budget
priorities change over time so would the per client expenditure norms for different services. The
apparent problem is that no one has stated what these financial per client norms should be for
any service in the Philippines. However, the actual historical data, for example, the actual
executed budgets of last year contain all the necessary data to compute the implicit per-client
financial norms (following the same example, the (implicit) budget norm for elementary
education can be obtained as the total sum spent on elementary education by all local
governments in the country divided by the total number of elementary school children in the
country. Note that expenditure norm is common to all local units (in the absence of variations in

20

This determination of the per-client expenditure norm can be done top-down and bottom-up. As discussed in
Appendix 2, a bottom-up methodology relies on the costing of the different elements of the service related to some
physical standards. This approach requires a lot of time and economic effort to put together and it risks arriving at
per user/client standards that are essentially unaffordable. What we proceed to discuss and illustrate is a bottomdown approach.
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cost provision).21 Once the methodology gets established using historical budget data, as we will
do here, the budget norms can be changed in every budget period.

The concept of potential users or clients deserves special attention: by users or clients we mean
all possible recipients of the services provided by a municipal government, which do not
necessarily correspond to the total population but could also represent a specific segment, such
as the elderly, students, the population of a particular geographic area, etc. Additionally, it is
important to distinguish between the potential users and those actually benefiting from the
services, since the last group might exclude eligible users due to, for instance, budgetary
limitations. Expenditure needs must be computed taking into account all eligible inhabitants (still
using our elementary education example, this means that the potential users include all children
of elementary school age, whether or not enrolled).

The practical steps are as follow:
Step 1: Determination of the expenditure aggregates or envelopes for each local unit function.
The application of this methodology requires the classification of municipal expenditures in
terms of the functions or services that the law has defined as a responsibility of local government
units, as well as demographic information to identify the amount of users from each of these
services.

The methodology of expenditure norms by client requires establishing the total amount of
resources actually spent (and in future years what the central government will determine) for
each local service or function. In order to make the procedure even simpler, it is possible to
group those functions with common users, or alternatively, to choose only the most important
ones, while the number of users for the remaining functions is assumed to be equal to the

21

This methodology and others that are used to estimate expenditure needs are budget preparation tools. In terms of
budget execution, the client-based expenditure norm may have a prescriptive character, forcing local governments to
spend according to the established norm, or it may just be optional, in which case the local governments are allowed
to decide a different amount of expenditure per client. The international practice on this is varied.
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population. Using historical expenditure data has the advantage of being feasible, because it is
based on effective expenditures incurred in the provision of local services in the country.22

The budget data for 2008 identify nine functional categories of local public expenditure: 1)
general public service 2) education, culture and sports 3) health, nutrition and population control
4) labor and employment 5) housing and community development 6) social security/social
service and welfare 7) economic services 8) debt servicing, and 9) other purposes. The
estimation of expenditure needs under the per-client expenditure norms methodology requires
the calculation of the numbers of the clients for each of the above categories of expenditures.

Local expenditure on general public service cannot be assigned to a particular demographic
group. Instead, this function benefits the community as a whole. We therefore define the total
population in the locality as the client base for this service. For similar reasons, we assume
economic service, debt servicing, and other expenditures are also spread among the whole
population of the locality.

In the case of education, culture and sports, local governments are generally responsible for the
provision of public school servicing, which include public kindergarten, primary schools and
high schools. Therefore, we define a range of population between ages 4-17 years as the number
of potential clients for education services. On the services of culture and sport, we assume in our
analysis that the users of these services are concentrated in the adult population before
retirement, which covers the range between 18-65. In sum, we consider a range of 4-65 as the
potential client numbers for this expenditure category.

The benefits of local expenditure in the area of health, nutrition and population control are
mainly limited to some specific groups, such as children, the elderly. However, services are
sometimes also provided to a more broad population. To capture this, we define a weighted
population, with double weights for population under 5 years of age and over 65 year of age and

22

If the potential users are more than those historically benefited, the historical expenditure starting point could
become an unfeasible standard.
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a single weight for the rest of the population (4-65), as the potential client numbers of this
expenditure category.

Services for labor and employment are clearly oriented to the adult population before retirement,
so we estimate the number of potential clients as the number of population with ages between 18
and 65.

The expenditure on housing and community development include services such as water supply
and sanitation, public lighting, natural gas infrastructure, and other communal services. In
general, most of these public services benefit entire families, especially poor families, rather than
a particular age or demographic group. Therefore, we use the number of poor households as an
indicator of need and develop our expenditure norm for housing and community development
services on that basis.23

Social security/social service and welfare is probably the expenditure function for which the
client base is more difficult to define. Services in this category are oriented to the assistance of
very specific groups, including the elderly, the handicapped and also children from troubled
social environments. Payments are sometimes also expensed to the unemployed and widowers.
At this time, due to limited data availability, we are unable to explicitly account for the different
client groups or their intensity of use of these services. Therefore, we will assume the elderly is
the most important group among the beneficiaries of social security, and use the number of
inhabitants over 65 years old as the potential client base for these services.

Let us note that it would be impractical and even misleading to try to define a per-client norm for
every single category of local expenditures. A large number of expenditure standards would
reduce transparency in the system and enhance the likelihood of complex discussions about the
proper client bases. In general, under ―other expenditures‖ we find that some functions are
unimportant in budgetary terms, as well as a varied combination of beneficiaries, so the local
population is again the best option to estimate the number of clients.

23

Poverty data for provinces are available for year 2009. However, these data are only available for year 2003 for
cities and municipalities. In the simulation analysis, we rely on the data we have.
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Step 2: Computation of per-client expenditure norm for each local function.
Here the expenditure aggregate (at the national level—covering all local units) for each function
is divided by the number of potential clients (also at the national level) of the services being
delivered. This needs to be done for each of the functional areas, covering the entire budget of
the local units. Naturally, the difficulty of this step lies in the identification of potential clients
for each service. For example, for education, the client base is logically school-age population.
For health, a client base can be built that overweighs the very young and elderly populations. For
social services for the poor the client base would be population living in poverty. And so on. The
entire population can be used as the default client base for those functions that cannot be
allocated to particular groups. It must be noted that the criteria opted for in the estimation of the
number of clients per expenditure category, although well aligned with current international
practice, are of course subject to improvements and intended to serve as mere examples of how
the per client expenditure norms should ideally be designed. In general, it is crucial to have well
defined expenditure responsibilities24
Step 3: Computation of expenditure needs for each function in each local unit.
Quite simply, this can be obtained by multiplying the per-client expenditure norm for each local
function by the client base for that function in the local unit.
Step 4: Computation of the total expenditures needs for each local government unit.
This corresponds simply to the sum of the expenditure needs for each function in each local unit.
Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 present the summary of the selected expenditure categories with
their respective of estimated number of clients, together with the respective per client
expenditure norm.

24

It is important to note again that the standards per client can be easily adjusted upward or downward to the
different costs of provisions of a particular service by applying a relative cost index to the standard. At the present
time, we have no reliable data on cost differences for service delivery and therefore no such adjustments are
performed.
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Table 3. The computation of expenditure norms for provinces (2008 values, in Ph Pesos)
Expenditure category

General public services
Education, culture and sports
Health, nutrition and population
control
Labor and employment
Housing and community development
Social security/social service and
welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes

Aggregate
expenditures
needs
(total exps. 2008)

Estimated
aggregate
number of
clients

20,953,886,720
2,315,550,208

68,607,096
57,524,236

9,033,858,048
30,161,374
827,712,832
972983,232
9,900,763,136
1,594,355,840
10,519,157,760

20,681,986
36,050,832
3,781,205
3,030,817
68,607,096
68,607,096
68,607,096

Per client
expenditure
norm
305.42
40.25
436.80
0.84
218.90
321.03
144.31
23.24
153.32

Source: Authors‘ own calculations

Table 4. The computation of expenditure norms for cities (2008 values, in Ph Pesos)
Expenditure category

General public services
Education, culture and sports
Health, nutrition and population
control
Labor and employment
Housing and community development
Social security/social service and
welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes
Source: Authors‘ own calculations

Aggregate
expenditures
needs
(total exps. 2008)

Estimated
aggregate
number of
clients

Per client
expenditure
norm

39,109,013,504
9,308,789,760

32,957,168
27,868,748

1,186.66
334.02

9,508,969
18,663,172
4314455

776.58
2.44
737.59

1,191,232
32,957,168
32,957,168
32957168

1,810.37
454.61
140.86
416.42

7,384,459,264
45,499,684
3182292480
2,156,575,232
14,982,636,544
4,642,338,816
13,723,859,968
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Table 5. The computation of expenditure norms for municipalities (2008 values, in Ph Pesos)
Expenditure category

General public services
Education, culture and sports
Health, nutrition and population
control
Labor and employment
Housing and community development
Social security/social service and
welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes

Aggregate
expenditures
needs
(total exps. 2008)

Estimated
aggregate
number of
clients

43,324,829,696
2,286,163,456

55,436,636
46,164,100

781.52
49.52

6,438,859,776
69,520,528
983,428,864

16,678,747
28,752,384
18,695,866

386.05
2.42
52.60

2,517,392,896
10,452,777,984
1,476,958,336
15,960,967,168

2,469,623
55,436,636
55,436,636
55,436,636

1,019.34
188.55
26.64
287.91

Per client
expenditure
norm

Source: Authors‘ own calculations

In Appendix 5, we provide a sample of the data generated to arrive to the expenditure needs of
each LGU.

Estimation of expenditure needs using Weighted Indexes (EN2)
An alternative method for the estimation of expenditure needs is to use an adjusted version of the
weighted index developed in the previous section.25 For this purpose, first, it is necessary to get
an aggregate estimate of expenditure needs for all LGUs in each subgroup. We will call these
LENp, LENc, LENm, representing respectively the aggregate expenditure needs for the
provinces (p), cities (c), and municipalities (m). For operational purposes, we are going to
assume those aggregate expenditure needs are equal to the aggregate executed expenditures in
the last year in each subgroup. These aggregates can be adjusted in different forms. Historical
expenditures (of last year) can be adjusted upward to the current year by applying a growth index
that may include the rate of inflation and possibly some real growth. Also each of the aggregates
could be adjusted up or down depending on a priori perceptions that some of the aggregates may
under-represent needs (perhaps the case of municipalities and perhaps also provinces) or overrepresent needs (perhaps the case of cities). In future years, the same approach could be used and

25

But recall that above the index formula is used to distribute the available funds in the FEEP. Here, the index
formula is used differently, namely, to compute expenditure needs
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of course the political factor can and should become more explicit in the setting and reordering
of expenditure priorities from the top down.

Second, it will be necessary to adjust the index formula used above so that it includes only those
factors representing expenditure needs. As we pointed out above, the index could be different for
the different subgroups, thus reflecting differences in expenditure needs. Here we will just use an
adjusted index that excludes the fiscal capacity factor:
AAIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3 (YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)
+ λ4 (OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi)
This index has the same properties as above and so they will not be repeated here. Table 6
summarizes the steps involved in estimating expenditure needs with this approach.

Table 6. Computing expenditure needs based on an index formula
Step 1.

Determination of the aggregate level of local expenditure needs (LENp,
LENc, LENm)
These can be based on the most recent historical data but that data can be
adjusted in different ways. In the computation we use executed budget data for
2008, and make no adjustments

Step 2.

Selection of expenditure needs factors
The expenditure needs factors selected can differ among subgroups of LGUs :
Here we will use population, land area, young population, elderly population
and population living in poverty.

Step 3.

Computation of each local unit’s relative need for each factor
The share of population for each local government in the entire population is
Popi/ΣPopi (and so on.

Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines

Step 4.

37

Determination of the relative importance or weights of each needs factor
The weights are assumed to be λ1 = 0.40 ; λ2 = 0.15; λ3 = 0.15; λ4 = 0.15;
λ5 = 0.15
Other sets of weights could be assumed and be simulated.

Step 5.

Calculation of the expenditure need for locality i as:
Need ip = AAIip · LENp for provinces
Need ic = AAIic · LENc for cities
Need im = AAIim · LENm for provinces

A summary of the computation is shown in Table 7 and an example of the data computation to
arrive at the results is shown in Appendix 6.
Table 7. Per capita expenditure needs using weighted index formula (Descriptive statistics
for 2008 in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

567.15
1,844.61
899.68
186.90
0.21

1,991.18
6,997.48
3,541.45
1,222.11
0.35

968.02
107,315.7
1,762.22
2,824.68
1.60

Source: Own Calculations.

Approaches to estimating fiscal capacity

Below we review two possible approaches to estimate the fiscal capacity of LGUs. Fiscal
capacity has been defined as the potential revenue that a local government can raise from its tax
base, exerting an average level of effort. Thus, in order to measure fiscal capacity, it would be
natural to focus on those revenues sources over which local governments have a certain degree
of autonomy (i.e. the capacity to modify either the base or the rates applied). These are usually
referred to as own revenues. Other revenues, such as shared taxes and transfers, of course,
provide local governments with revenues, but since they cannot be directly affected by local
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governments, they can be accounted for directly by the amounts actually received by local
governments for those concepts.
The adequate estimation of local fiscal capacity becomes important because of the ability local
governments have to affect actual tax collections. As the fiscal gap (and thus the FEEP transfer
actually received) is expected to be larger with lower fiscal capacity, there may be an incentive
for government officials to reduce tax effort from their own revenue sources (those over which
they can exert effective autonomy). In contrast, as just remarked above, those other revenue
sources not subject to the influence of local government actions, such as shared taxes or other
transfers, do not present any difficulty in this regard. For revenues outside the control of local
governments, historical or actual revenues usually represent a good approximation to revenue
collection capacity.

The problem of estimating fiscal capacity is therefore reduced to the adequate estimation of
(properly defined) own revenues. Thus we can define over all fiscal capacity as the sum of
estimated potential own revenues (EORi), and all other shared revenues and transfers received
(OT) other than the FEEP transfer. The fiscal capacity of a local unit i can then be computed as:

FC i  EORi  OTi ,
Unfortunately, there is usually a lack of data on tax bases which limits our ability to properly
estimate own revenue capacity. Nevertheless there is information on cadastral values for the
property tax which we will try to use.

Regardless of the methodology used to estimate potential own revenues, overall per capita fiscal
capacity is obtained, as shown in the formula, by adding up the estimate of own revenues to the
actual shared revenue shares and all transfers (except for those received from the FEEP.)

In the following discussion we present two methodologies for estimating potential own revenues
(EORi).
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Estimation of Fiscal Capacity using Average of Past Collection Ratios (FC1)
In the absence of detailed local data the estimation of fiscal capacity can be based on historical
information available for local fiscal revenues. In general terms, this methodology can be
described by the following procedure:

Step 1: Select the revenue sources and time periods that would help to estimate the ability of
local governments to collect their own revenues ( ORi ), and for which complete
information is available. It is useful to use, for example, average data for the last three
years. The categories considered in the estimation should be those for which local
government units have some discretion or ability to change effort of collection. So this
category should include perhaps fully assigned taxes to local units plus all user fees and
charges.

Step 2: Compute revenues based on the local revenue source j, Fj, for each local unit i and do
the same at the national level for all local units in the same subgroup. We can define
Fi j  ocal revenues from j

and

as the revenue from source j in each in local unit i

FN j  total revenues insubgroupfrom j

as the revenue in the set of all local units in the subgroup from source j. It follows that
total current own revenues for the local unit i is given by
subgroup of local units by

F
j

Nj



j

Fi j and for the entire

.

Stressing a very important issue, the estimation of fiscal capacity should be based on potential
revenues. As explained, the use of historical or actual fiscal revenues might result in providing
perverse incentives to local governments. A practical way of facing this problem is to consider
an average of the relative (with respect to the national level) per capita tax collections for a
relatively longer period of time (say, three years) as an indicator of local fiscal capacity. The idea
is in using averages of several periods, it will become more difficult for local units to alter the
indicator of relative fiscal capacity.
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Step 3: Compute the index of relative fiscal capacity, IRFCi, for each subgroup of local units
(Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) which can be defined as the historical average
(2008-2010) of

 j Fi j  j FN j , representing the relation between the own revenue of

local unit i and the one for the entire subgroup.

Step 4: Compute the fiscal capacity for each municipality i in each subgroup as:

FC i  IRFC i  aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup
such that FCi can be interpreted as the amount of collections that a local governments
would have in the projected period. For the purpose of the simulations, we will use the
aggregate own revenue collections for each subgroup of the last year available as a way
to define ―aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup.” Note that the
aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup for future years could be
obtained by applying a growth index to the base year based on the inflation rate and
some estimate of real growth for the main tax bases.

Although at the present time the implementation of this methodology is less than ideal, it may be
a good alternative to estimate potential own revenues and fiscal capacity of LGUs in the short
term. The data required in this approach are not difficult to generate, and the use of several
periods provides a simple and effective way to reduce the perverse incentives‘ problem but
clearly it does not eliminate it.

A sample of the data and procedures followed to estimating the capacity with the average of past
collection ratios is shown in Appendix 7 while the summary descriptive statistics are shown in
Table 8.

Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines

41

Table 8. Per capita fiscal capacity using Average of Past Collection Ratios (Descriptive
statistics)

Provinces

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation

431.87
11,126.72
1,357.81
1,295.27
0.95

Cities

Municipalities

1,434.61
15,526.94
3,464.35
1,582.38
0.46

441.95
269,194.9
2,288.65
7,105.55
3.10

Source: Own Calculations.

Estimation of Fiscal Capacity using Basic Proxies (FC2)
Another methodology that can be used to calculate local fiscal capacity is to employ a proxy (or
proxies) that are highly correlated with a local unit‘s own capacity to collect revenues. Ideally,
one would use some measure of gross local product or per capita income, but lacking those data
we propose to use property value assessments as a proxy for the entire own revenue capacity
(and not just property taxes). This may be less than ideal because a good proxy requires that local
government units do not have any capacity to modify the values the proxy takes.

The logic behind using property value assessments lies in that first it is the variable available that
is close to some measure of tax bases and second, that is not unreasonable to think that if
assessed values are high other tax bases in the local governments are also likely to be high. That
is, we would anticipate that property value assessments are highly correlated with other local tax
bases. Unfortunately, we only have property value assessments for provinces and cities, but not
for municipalities. Therefore, this measure of fiscal capacity ‗FC2‘ is only calculated for
provinces and cities.

The basic regressions of local own revenues on property value assessments are shown in Table 9.
The relative high values of the R-square indicate a good fit and high explanatory power of the
chosen proxy. The summary statistics for the estimated fiscal capacity are shown in Table 10.
Cities on average, and as expected, have higher per capita fiscal capacity, more than double the
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per capita capacity of provinces. The variation in the estimates is quite lager in the case of the
provinces as measured by the coefficient of variation.
Table 9. Property value assessments as a Proxy Variable for Local Own Revenues

Constant
Property Tax
Assess
coefficient
R-square
F-Statistic

Province
Coefficients t - Stat
4.69e+07
4.28
.007

City
Coefficients t - Stat
1.50e+07
0.40

13.73

0.71
188.38

0.042

Municipality
Coefficients t - Stat
-

31.25

0.88
976.47

-

-

-

-

Source: Department of Finance and own calculations.

Table 10. Per capita fiscal capacity using basic proxies (Descriptive statistics for 2008 in
PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

433.12
10,759.2
1,346.35
1,255.44
0.93

1,416.93
12,544.29
3,512.88
1,575.95
0.45

-

Source: Own Calculations.

Coming up with the Fiscal Gap for LGUs
The two last sub-sections have dealt with the methodologies for estimating, separately,
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity for each LGU. In this section we look at the possible
combinations of those measures in order to compute the fiscal gap for LGUs.

From the combination of the alternative methodologies described above, we can derive up to
four measurements of fiscal gaps for the three groups of LGUs. Naturally, each measurement
would lead to a different distribution of the FEEP funds across the LGUs. The four alternatives
are presented in the following chart:
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Fiscal Capacity Measurement
Average of Past

Basic Proxy

Collection Ratios
(FC1)

(FC2)

Per Client Expenditure Norms

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

(EN1)

Measure 1

Measure 2

Weighted Indexes

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

(EN2)

Measure 3

Measure 4

Expenditure
Needs
Measurement

Thus, for instance, Fiscal Gap Measure 3 is based on the estimation of expenditure needs
according to the weighted indexes‘ methodology (EN2) and the estimated value of local fiscal
capacity obtained by using the average of past collection ratios (FC1), such that the fiscal gap be
defined as:
FG3 = EN2 – FC1.

Naturally, different measures of fiscal gaps will be obtained from different combinations, and a
discussion ensues as to which of the available alternatives make more sense to be used in the
distribution of the FEEP in the short to medium term. In Tables 11 to 13 we present descriptive
statistics for the four alternative measures and to make them more comparable we express them
in per capita terms.

It needs to be clear that no measure of fiscal gap can be said to be superior to another based only
on these statistics, but it is important to have a notion about the distribution of per capita fiscal
gaps in order to evaluate and compare the performance of the alternative methodologies. In truth,
what matters is the quality of the estimations of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The more
accurate those estimations are, then the more reliable will be the estimation of per capita fiscal
disparities.
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Table 11. Fiscal Gaps for Provinces (Descriptive statistics)
(2008 values, in PHP)

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Measure 1

Measure 2

Measure 3

Measure 4

Min

-3,141.47

-3,314.35

-2,685.70

-2,858.58

Max

375.06

373.81

359.97

358.72

Range (max - min)

3,516.53

3,688.16

3,045.67

3,217.30

Average

-413.12

-398.38

-332.89

-318.15

Standard deviation

668.93

669.26

556.39

557.41

Average of positive fiscal disparities

106.15

111.51

126.22

109.86

Number of localities with positive FD

21

19

16

20

Source: Own calculations

Table 12. Fiscal Gaps for Cities (Descriptive statistics)
(2008 values, in PhP)

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Measure 1

Measure 2

Measure 3

Measure 4

Min

-12,754.2

-9,771.62

-13,503.8

-10,521.2

Max

1,394.33

1,477.18

2,986.23

2,940.93

14,148.59

11,248.80

16,490.09

13,462.14

Average

-517.18

-559.21

86.41

27.18

Standard deviation

1,599.82

1,577.06

1,943.91

1,871.69

Average of positive fiscal disparities

467.71

488.73

988.12

956.84

Number of localities with positive FD

55

54

90

85

Range (max - min)

Source: Own calculations

From Tables 11 to 13 it is important to note that the results from the four proposals are mostly
consistent in terms of the determination of local units with positive fiscal disparities (i.e.
expenditure needs greater than fiscal capacities); perhaps the exception is for the case of cities.
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Table 13. Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities (Descriptive statistics)
(2008 values, in PhP)

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Fiscal Gap

Measure 1

Measure 2

Measure 3

Measure 4

Min

-26,7796.6

-

-16,1879.3

-

Max

1,042.23

-

1,176.10

-

26,8838.8

-

16,3055.4

-

Average

-776.57

-

-530.03

-

Standard deviation

7146.20

-

4372.80

-

Average of positive fiscal disparities

205.23

-

193.91

-

Number of localities with positive FD

467

-

493

-

Range (max - min)

Source: Own calculations

Following the discussion presented throughout this report, one of the two most important goals
of the FEEP will be to reduce the differences in fiscal disparities (or fiscal gaps) across LGUs. In
practical terms, this requires reducing to a greater extent the largest local fiscal disparities.

Any measurement of (per capita) fiscal gap provides a natural criterion for the assignment of
FEEP funds. Those local units with negative fiscal gaps (with fiscal capacity exceeding their
expenditure needs) do not require, in principle, funds from the FEEP program. At the same time,
those localities with larger (positive) fiscal gaps should receive greater (per capita) transfers than
others with smaller fiscal disparities. These are widely accepted principles. However, how big a
per capital fiscal gap should be in order to define a local unit as beneficiary and how much more
FEEP funds should be given to a relatively ―needy‖ jurisdiction are open questions which cannot
receive definite answers. Below, we implement one of several alternative approaches to
apportioning the available FEEP funds among local units with positive fiscal disparities, which
we can label the proportional allocation mechanism. This approach apportions the available
transfer funds among local units as a fixed proportion of their (positive) fiscal disparities within
each subgroup of LGUs. No matter what the size of fiscal disparity is, all local units with a
positive fiscal gap will receive a transfer from the FEEP, and the size of the transfer will depend
on the percentage of total positive disparities represented by that local unit and, of course, on the
size of the FEEP funds to be transferred.
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This latter point brings us back to the issue of the vertical distribution of the FEEP funds across
the different subgroups. Here we will make two sets of assumptions for actually implementing
the FEEP distributions. In the first case, we repeat the vertical distribution assumed in the
subsection above ―Simpler approach--Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA‖ and
assign 28.75 percent of the available FEEP funds to the provinces, 28.75 percent to the cities,
and 42.50 percent to the municipalities.

In the second approach, we apportion the FEEP funds proportionally to the total (positive) fiscal
gaps for each subgroup of LGUs. In order to arrive at these proportions we add all the (positive)
fiscal gaps across the three subgroups of LGUs and then derive the proportion for each. As we
have discussed above, this approach is far from ideal because our estimations of fiscal gaps is
conditional on the current systems of intergovernmental finance, including the IRA. In the future,
it will be possible to arrive at measures of fiscal gap that are based on normative statements of
expenditure needs of the different LGUs. That would provide a better justification for the vertical
apportionment of the FEEP funds based on the proportional size of aggregate fiscal gaps for the
different subgroups of LGUs.
The results from implementing the ―Proportional Allocation Mechanism‖ for FEEP Funds:
In order to apportion the available FEEP funds for the three subgroups of LGUs we first compute
the relative fiscal gaps for provinces, cities, municipalities following the steps described above.26
The results for the relative fiscal gaps, which, recall, only apply to those LGUs with positive
fiscal gaps, are shown in Tables 14 to 16, for provinces, cities and municipalities, respectively..
Examples of the steps followed for these computations are shown in Appendix 8.

26

See the section ―Distributing the FEEP funds on the basis of estimated fiscal gaps of LGUs” above in this
paper.
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Table 14. Relative Fiscal Gaps for Provinces (Descriptive statistics)

Min
Max
Range (max - min)
Average
Standard deviation

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Gap Measure 1

Gap Measure 2

Gap Measure 3

Gap Measure 4

0.0006
0.1683
0.1677

0.0015
0.1764
0.1749

0.0067
0.1782
0.1716

0.0027
0.1633
0.1605

0.048
0.043

0.053
0.045

0.063
0.043

0.050
0.039

Source: Own calculations

Table 15. Relative Fiscal Gaps for Cities (Descriptive statistics)

Min
Max
Range (max - min)
Average
Standard deviation

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Gap Measure 1

Gap Measure 2

Gap Measure 3

Gap Measure 4

0.0004
0.0542
0.0538

0.0002
0.0560
0.0558

0.0012
0.0336
0.0323

0.0001
0.0362
0.0360

0.0182
0.0143

0.0185
0.0128

0.0111
0.0070

0.0118
0.0076

Source: Own calculations

Table 16. Relative Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities (Descriptive statistics)
Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Relative Fiscal

Gap Measure 1

Gap Measure 2

Gap Measure 3

Gap Measure 4

Min
Max
Range (max - min)

6.27E-07
0.010875
0.010874

-

3.84E-06
0.012303
0.012299

-

Average
Standard deviation

0.002141
0.001568

-

0.002028
0.001541

-

Source: Own calculations

Table 17 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the allocation of FEEP transfers
assigned using the fiscal gap measure 1 (FG1) (i.e. with per-client expenditure norms for
measuring expenditure needs (EN1) and the average of past collection ratios for measuring fiscal
capacity (FC1), also using the proportional allocation mechanism for the apportionment of the
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funds, and using the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above ―Simpler approach-Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA‖ by assigning 28.75 percent of the available
FEEP funds to the provinces, 28.75 percent to the cities, and 42.50 percent to the municipalities.
Table 17. Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted IRA
Vertical Distribution Rule
(for 2008 in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(in million PhP)

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

0
2031.23
126.42
326.42
2.58

0
4445.48
576.52
1016.61
1.76

0
9068.76
315.71
669.30
2.12

15,376.74

15,376.74

22,730.83

Source: Own Calculations.

Next, we perform an alternative allocation of the FEEP transfers by using the same set of
assumptions except for the vertical distribution of the funds among provinces, cities, and
municipalities. Here we apportion the FEEP funds proportionally to the total (positive) fiscal
gaps for each subgroup of LGUs. Thus, first we compute the proportions or shares in the total for
positive fiscal gaps across the three groups of LGUs. The allocation of FEEP transfers that
would follow if we were to use this vertical distribution rule would be quite different from those
in Table 17. As shown in Table 18, for the summary statistics of this distribution, the clear
winners, vis-à-vis the results in Table 17, would be the municipalities. Both provinces and cities
would be relative losers, and more so for the provinces.

The horizontal distribution rule applied in both Tables 17 and 18 is an example of how this
allocation can be done. As we have seen, there are other possibilities for the horizontal allocation
and they are all legitimate. Improving on the horizontal allocation rule will be conditioned by the
improvements of the available data so that more sophisticated methodologies can be used to
capture expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
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Table 18. Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Share of
Aggregate Fiscal Gap Vertical Distribution Rule
(for 2008 in PhP)

Min
Max
Average
Standard deviation
Coeff. of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(in million PhP)

Provinces

Cities

Municipalities

0
127.17
7.92
20.44
2.58

0
3,213.12
416.70
734.79
1.76

0
16,520.08
575.12
1,219.23
2.12

9,627.18

11,114.03

41,407.54

Source: Own Calculations.

On the other hand, fundamentally, there are no very strong reasons supporting either modality of
vertical allocation of the FEEP funds among the three subgroups of LGUs respectively used in
Table 17 and Table 19. Their advantage is that they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution
as opposed to some rule that is arbitrarily derived. However, as we have argued above in the
paper, we could arrive at a strong vertical allocation rule if we were to use normatively derived
expenditure norms in the computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. This would also
improve the horizontal distribution of the funds within each subgroup of LGUs. But as we have
already indicated, this paper cannot make those adjustments. They only can be done by the
Government of the Philippines.
To close this section we examine some of the dimensions of the equalization impact of
distributing the FEEP funds using a fiscal gap approach.

First we must note again that not all LGUs receive transfers funds under this approach. As we
find in Tables 11 to 13 above, only a share of provinces, cities and municipalities end up with a
positive fiscal gap and would therefore be entitled to receiving FEEP funds. Based on the total
numbers for the different subgroups of LGUs,27 our simulations show that only between 20 and

27

The percentages that follow are based on totals of 78 provinces, 136 cities, and 1,492 municipalities.
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27 percent of the provinces would receive FEEP funds, between 40 and 61 percent of cities, and
between 31 and 33 percent of municipalities. 28

Table 19. Coefficient of Variation of the Per Capita Incomes Available Before and After
FEEP
Before FEEP
After FEEP 1
After FEEP 2
After FEEP 3

Provinces
0.936
0.510
0.471
0.542

Cities
0.445
0.383
0.356
0.360

Municipalities
3.108
2.714
2.733
2.497

Note: FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution formula and adjusted
IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and adjusted IRA
vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and share of aggregate
fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

Second, the impact of the FEEP distribution is equalizing as can be seen in Table 19 by the
significant reductions in the coefficient of variation for per capita income available before and
after the distribution of the FEEP within the provinces, cities, and municipalities.
Third, the amounts per capita distributed with the FEP are not at all trivial if we compare them
side by side with the amounts per capita received from the IRA; actually in many cases they can
be much higher. In Tables 20 to 22 we show the per capita amounts received from the IRA and
from the FEEP for the ten largest winners (in per capita FEEP amounts) for the provinces, cities
and municipalities.

28

It needs to be recalled that not all cities are well-off and that the computed fiscal gap is still a relative concept
based on historical data. Because there are few cities that are very rich that is likely to pull a large number of other
cities into having a positive fiscal gap. A lot of these numbers could change in the future once absolute measures of
expenditure needs are derived.
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Table 20. Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based
on the fiscal gap 1): Provinces
Region
Region XII
Region III
Region III
Region V
Region I
Region IX
Region VI
Region IV-A
Region VII
Region VI

Province
Maguindanao
Nueva Ecija
Pampanga
Camarines Sur
Pangasinan
Sulu
Iloilo
Rizal
Bohol
Negros
Occidental

IRA
412.634
491.088
473.961
590.530
492.485
633.692
577.965
432.889
671.935

FEEP 1
204.548
190.542
158.447
214.251
172.967
210.077
197.140
144.583
228.898

FEEP 2
2031.225
941.812
784.321
843.024
482.037
1305.255
513.449
363.529
556.333

FEEP 3
127.172
58.966
49.105
52.781
30.180
81.720
32.146
22.760
34.831

593.041

187.058

279.647

17.508

Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

Table 21. Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based
on the fiscal gap 1): Cities
Region
Region XII
Region III
Region XII
Region XII
Region IV-A
Region I
Region VII
Region V
Region III
Region IX

City
Cotabato City
San Jose del Monte City
Marawi City
General Santos City
Antipolo City
San Carlos City
Talisay City (Cebu)
Tabaco City
Malolos City
Zamboanga City

IRA
1333.994
1013.657
1372.108
1251.368
1048.766
1702.440
1260.918
1774.952
1234.820
1493.793

FEEP 1
543.052
366.653
544.568
396.923
332.166
609.463
471.279
645.854
439.594
440.437

FEEP 2
3216.155
1893.676
4376.881
1103.752
906.155
3524.536
3083.100
4445.481
2392.208
681.666

FEEP 3
2324.581
1368.716
3163.533
797.773
654.953
2547.473
2228.411
3213.116
1729.046
492.697

Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.
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Table 22. Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based
on the fiscal gap 1): Municipalities
Region
Region IX
Region IX
Region XII
Region VII
Region IX
Region XII
Region XII
Region IX
Region XII
Region XII

Province
Tawi-Tawi
Basilan
Maguindanao
Cebu
Sulu
Lanao Del Sur
Maguindanao
Sulu
Maguindanao
Maguindanao

Municipality
Balimbing
Maluso
Datu Odin Sinsuat
Barili
Jolo
Piagapo
Matanog
Indanan
Parang
Talayan

IRA
439.561
745.383
654.487
745.354
747.425
850.203
848.958
860.292
731.079
870.496

FEEP 1
403.718
351.985
328.303
361.131
272.250
459.664
419.647
312.326
338.620
441.588

FEEP 2
4894.385
3496.870
1533.682
2604.800
1116.778
4373.018
4149.793
1712.173
1383.433
5355.485

FEEP 3
8915.842
6370.063
2793.828
4745.025
2034.376
7966.094
7559.458
3118.974
2520.127
9755.804

Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

V. Performance-based evaluation of recipient LGUs

A key element in the design of the FEEP will be to ensure that these additional funds will be
used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. There are essentially two different
approaches that can be used with the end of monitoring and improving the performance of
LGUs. The first is a traditional approach using ex-ante controls and conditions on how the LUGs
can deploy the additional funds. These include regulations for how the funds may be spent, what
kind of inputs can be used, pre-approval of local decisions by higher authorities, and so on. The
trend in budgeting policy and practice worldwide has been toward deemphasizing or plainly
abandoning this approach. The second option is to focus on the performance of LGUs by
examining ex-post what they have been able to achieve in what ultimately matters, visible
quantifiable improvements in the quality and quantity of public services for which they are
responsible. This new trend merges perfectly well with the emphasis at the national level on
performance-based budgeting and medium-term budgeting frameworks. However, there are
significant difficulties in implement this second approach. In the real world, it tends to be
simpler and easier to measure inputs than to measure outputs. In particular, the measurement of
the quality and quantity of many public services can be quite challenging. But significant
advances have been made in this area, and therefore, despite the challenges, it would seem that
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using ex-post performance-based evaluation would be the best direction to go to ensure the more
efficient use of FEEP funds.

Although they are not uncommon, the experience worldwide with performance-based grants is
not yet large. Bergvall et al. (2006) review some of the European experience with this type of
grants and Shah (2009) reviews the experiences of other developed and developing countries.
Actually some of the performance-based grants in other countries are quite recent, such as
Australia‘s ―National Schools Specific Purpose Payments‘ and the U.S. ―Race to the Top
Competitive Grant Program.‖ Among developing countries, Brazil has implemented
performance-based grants for education and health. Other countries, including Argentina, Chile
and Indonesia have implemented this type of grants for a variety of service, including roads,
water, or even social insurance.

In general, there are different implementation paths that can be followed. Two important
objectives would be to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs and to give them enough
time to adjust and ratchet up their performance. This latter will be important because many of the
recipient LGUs will be relatively poorer ones with lower administrative capacity.
What is proposed here is to provide LGUs a period of time (for example, 3 years) 29 after
receiving the additional funds to show proof of improved performance in a number of carefully
selected indicators. In the case of unsatisfactory performance a probationary period of 3 more
years but with reduced funding from the FEEP of 50 percent would be granted. In the case of
failure again after the probationary period the FEEP allocation would be terminated for say a
period of 3 additional years. After that a new cycle could be started for qualifying LGUs under
the FEEP horizontal distribution rules. Of course, these are suggestive periods and rules and will
be subject to modification and improvements through a dialog with stakeholders, especially the
associations of LGUs.

29

The selection of the time period may not be a simple matter since the typical terms of local officials is 3 years, so
it is not clear that the right incentives would be in place.
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A big challenge will lie in the selection of the performance indicators. The indicators at a
minimum should meet these characteristics or properties. They need to be measured
independently from the LGUs themselves; that is, they cannot be self-reported to avoid moral
hazard problems. Ideally, the measurements will be provided by an independent agency which is
accepted with respect and credibility by all stakeholders. The indicators also need to be
‗meaningful‘; that is to matter in a significant way for quality and quantity of public services and
ultimately for the quality of life of the residents in each LGU.

An additional challenge is that whatever indicators are selected, the different LGUs are likely to
start in terms of those indicators at different points. This means that if the indicator levels are
chosen to be low, many LGUs would just automatically qualify, which would produce no
inducement to increase performance. A potential solution to this dilemma may be to focus on
differentiated changes in those indicators as opposed to the levels per se of the indicators. But
this choice will not be free of problems because the relative difficulty of achieving advances in
the different indicators is not likely to be independent of the level of the indicator itself; for
example, improvements may be easier to achieve at relatively low levels of the indicator. This is
an area that will require ample discussion and consensus reaching with stakeholders.

One first choice of performance criteria is whether they should concentrate exclusively on the
expenditure-service side of the budget or could also include criteria from the revenue side of the
budget.

There are good arguments to include the revenue side of the budget as part of the performance
indicators. Many observers of the decentralization process in the Philippines have highlighted the
low level and declining trend in own revenue collections by LGUs A possible performance
criterion would involve certain percent increases in the collection of property taxes, or perhaps
all own revenues.

However, it is clear that the bulk of the performance criteria would come from the expenditureservice side of the budget. An important decision will be whether to focus on the outputs of
services or else on the outcomes. In general, the indicators should preferably be service outputs,
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as opposed to outcomes, given the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service
outcomes. For example, local jurisdictions can do much more to ensure high rates of vaccination
or enrollments rates for children. They are less able to control the overall health of children or
their overall level of intellectual achievement since these outcomes depend on many other
variables, including the income and level of education of parents, which are outside the control
of the local governments.

The property of ―meaningfulness‖ could be met if the performance

indicators were to focus at least in part on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the
areas of health, education and poverty reduction. Possible candidates for performance
measurement could include: the percent change in infant mortality rate, the percent change in
enrollment rates, and percent change in access to potable water. But as simple as these indicators
may look, there would still be formidable difficulties in getting them implemented.

In the first place, even though they are all meaningful and desirable outcomes, they may not be
well under the control or doings of LGUs since there are other influencing factors out of the
control of LGUs. For example, enrollment rates may depend on agricultural production cycles
and related family demands. Thus some thought needs to be given to the selection of those types
of outcomes as indicators vis-à-vis intermediate outputs, which will be more under the control of
LGUs, for example, the percent of doctor-assisted births. In the second place, even when the
outcome indicators are thought to be the right ones, the challenge will be to measure them in an
objective and consistent basis. All this means that considerable further thought and discussions
will need to be put into arriving at the FEEP performance indicators.

So there will be important challenges ahead in selecting the appropriate performance indicators.
Fortunately, solid foundation work has been already done in the Philippines in the area of LGU
performance measurement, as for example by Sosmeña et al. (2004) and Guillermo (2008). The
Department of Interior and Local Governments (DILG) has developed its own Local
Government Performance Measurement System (LGPMS) which also provides a good starting
point for the selection of the proper performance indicators.30

30

See also the background report from the Department of Finance (2008).
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VI. Summary and conclusions

The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized
for two main failings: its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer
municipalities and provinces, and that its funds have not been spent in an efficient manner.
Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP) for an
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50
percent, and several draft Bills have been prepared. There appears to be ample consensus that if
the additional 10 percent in funding were to take place, these funds should not be distributed
following the same methodology used for the IRA. Two general requirements are often
mentioned: that the additional funds would need to have a much stronger equalization effect
among LGUs, and that the recipient LGUs use the funds to improve the performance of public
services.
The design of the new transfer -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance‖ or
FEEP-- for 10 percent additional funding as separate from the IRA will face four major
challenges: (1) How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional
funding (2) How to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs
(provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays) (3) What formula to use for the distribution of
the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs (4) How to ensure
that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance
These four challenges are addressed in this paper.

Regarding how to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional
funding, we have explored two basic options: Using the same base as for the IRA, which is
internal revenue collection, or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands
the IRA base to include all the collections also realized by the Customs Office. Obviously, the 10
percent equivalent increase in funding would be the same under both options. The only
difference is how the two bases perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their
volatility. We find that although there is some evidence that the broader base exhibits a bit more
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volatility over time, the differences are not too significant. Therefore, there is not a clear
preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to apportion the additional funding
among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays). In the
paper we explore several possibilities. One of the options considered is a modified IRA
apportionment by excluding the Barangays from the vertical distribution. We also consider a
second option with the vertical distribution among provinces, cities and municipalities being
proportional to their respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those fiscal gaps are
estimated in this paper. The advantage of either approach is that they offer a rationale for the
vertical distribution as opposed to some new rule that is again arbitrarily derived. Fundamentally
the only sound approach to the derivation of the vertical distribution rule is to institute it in
accordance with the true expenditure needs of the different subgroups of LGUs. The expenditure
needs derived in this paper are based on recent budget data and of course they do not necessarily
coincide with what is considered to be the ‗true‘ expenditures needs. That is, the expenditure
needs we derive in the paper reflect the actual expenditures of different LGUs. If, for example,
cities receive proportionally much more funds than municipalities, the budgetary data and
therefore the computed expenditure needs will reflect higher expenditure needs for cities when
this actually may not be the case from a normative stand. In the paper we argue that we can
arrive at a strong vertical allocation rule if we were to use normatively derived expenditure
norms in the computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. But as we also indicate, this paper
cannot make the normative decisions necessary for the true expenditure needs. This only can be
done by the Government of the Philippines.

The main body of the paper addresses the question of what formula to use for the distribution of
the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group. Here there seems to be clear
the consensus on the need to improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions and
based on a weighted index of population, land area, and equal shares. In the paper we develop
two alternative approaches. First we improve and expand the weighted index approach now used
in the IRA by introducing additional factors to better proxy the difference in expenditures needs.
These factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. We also
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introduce an additional factor accounting for the differences in fiscal capacity across LGUs. The
second approach consists in the estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different
methodologies available for the estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and it
implements with data for 2008 two measures for the estimation of expenditures needs and also
two measures for the estimation of fiscal capacity. The simulations of the FEEP transfers are
carried out with the different methodologies assuming two different vertical allocation rules
(across subgroups of LGUs). The first is a modified IRA allocation rule (excluding Barangays)
and the second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each subgroup of LGUs
(provinces, cities and municipalities). Using the fiscal gap approach allows restriction of FEEP
transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap (that is, where expenditure needs
exceed fiscal capacity). Under the (expanded) weighted index approach all LGUs receive FEEP
transfers.

The last section of the paper addresses the issue of how to make sure that the additional FEEP
funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using
ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposes to use ex-post
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The
carefully selected performance indicators would need to be measured independently from the
LGUs themselves and should be meaningful in mattering in a significant way in the quality of
life of LGU residents. The indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to
outcomes, given the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes.
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance
would need to be read as differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver
improved performance in the set period, say after 3 years, would be followed by suspension of
half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance, for example three
more years, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to improve, or
fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explores the past experience in
the Philippines with performance indicators and the several possibilities there may be available,
the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work in the future.
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Appendices

Appendix 1. The Basic Rationale and Measurement of Weights for Expenditure Need Factors

There are two main ways to approach the measurement of expenditure needs factors: the number
of clients and the cost of standard local service provision.

The number of clients can be used when the cost of the public service varies directly with the
number of users. In particular, when the per unit cost of the public service is the same across
jurisdictions and does not change with the number of users, a direct application of this approach
would be the best option to estimate expenditure needs.

If an expenditure need factor captures the number of consumers for a particular local service,
then the natural choice for the weight assigned to this factor would be the percent of aggregate
local expenditures accounted for expenditures on this particular service. For instance, if
education is 43 percent of the aggregate local budget, one may wish to assign the factor ―schoolaged children‖ a weight of 0.43 in the expenditure needs formula.

It is, however, very common to observe differences in the costs of inputs across jurisdictions, as
well as changes in production costs as the number of local public services is increased, specially
due to economies of scale. In such cases, it would be desirable to identify the factors determining
these cost differentials. These estimations can serve for developing a weighted factor formula or
for adjusting the per client cost of local service delivery. Unfortunately, no data of cost
difference are readily available in the Philippines.

Nevertheless, in those cases for which factors attempt to capture the costs of producing local
services rather than number of consumers, the assignment of weights would require a somewhat
different type of reasoning. In general, arriving at particular weight factors in a scientific
objective way is a very difficult task. One possibility is to take actual expenditures by local
government in a base year as a measure of their expenditure needs (the dependent variable), and
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then to run a regression on those factors considered as relevant in determining cost differentials
across jurisdictions.
In order to estimate an ―expenditure need‖ equation we would need to redefine the variables in
the same scale (a standard normal transformation could be a good alternative) and to force the
intercept of the regression to be zero. Once all variables are defined in an identical scale, the
coefficients of the regression would provide a measure of the relative effect that, in average, each
factor has on the dependent variable. Of course, it is not guaranteed that the coefficients so
obtained would add up to 1, and thus a correction should be made in order to achieve this
condition. Another possibility would be to estimate the equation imposing that linear restriction
on the estimated coefficients. At any rate, the estimated coefficient would then represent the
weights by which the factors should enter in the index formula to approximate expenditure
needs.
Appendix 2. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Expenditure Needs31

The expenditure needs of a jurisdiction may be defined as the funding necessary to cover all
expenditure responsibilities assigned to the sub-national government at a standard level of
service provision. In practice, there are several options to measure differences in expenditure
needs across sub-national governments. In the following discussion we will describe six
methodologies, which are presented in order of complexity from the simplest to the most
complex one.

1. Lagged expenditure values
An uncomplicated way to define the expenditure needs of a locality is relying on historical
expenditure patterns. Specifically, the available information on expenditure data of the last
year(s) –adjusted by inflation– could be assumed to represent the expenditures needs for each
jurisdiction. If local government have a great deal of discretion in deciding the amount spent
during a period, this method offers a reasonably realistic estimation of expenditure needs, with
important advantages like simplicity and minimum information requirements. Unfortunately,
31

See Gomez et a. (2007) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
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under discretion, and particularly if local governments have access to the financial markets, the
use of historical data could also provide perverse incentives to the local authorities, because they
will eventually ―learn‖ that increasing expenditures in the present will result in higher
equalization transfers in the future.

On the other hand, in the absence of discretion the actual expenditures of past periods could be
determined by the particular financial constraints of the localities, which are imposed either by
the central government or by the inability to raise revenues locally. In such rather common cases,
the historical expenditure patterns would reflect undesired differences in revenue-rising ability
instead of expenditure needs, and thus they should not be used to estimate the expenditure needs.

As a conclusion, to rely directly on lagged expenditure patterns is not a recommendable way to
estimate expenditure needs under equalization transfer purposes.

2. Equal per capita expenditure norm
The simplest way to estimate the per capita expenditure needs is by taking the average of
historical expenditures per capita at a national level. In order to compute this average, it is fist
necessary to determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN), which can
be based on adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast, and then to divide this amount by
the national population. This simple procedure results advantageous when there is no detailed
information about the differences in the per capita needs or cost of provision of local public
services across jurisdictions or when there are reasons to believe that those differences are
negligible.

The per capita expenditure need will constitute a national norm in this case, and in order to
compute the expenditure needs for each locality it will only be necessary to multiply this norm
by the local population:

EN i 

SEN
 Pi
PN
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Indeed, the local population is likely the most important variable determining the total
expenditure needs and the cost of public service provision for a local government, because it
directly provides an order of magnitude for the total amount of expenditures that must be
incurred. Of course, economies of scale, economies of agglomeration, demographic
characteristics of the population, geographical differences of jurisdictions and other factors can
substantially modify the applicability of the national average for each and every jurisdiction. In
that case, the national norm could eventually be adjusted by one or more indexes containing
information about differences in relative needs or costs of provision. If the index is a good
approximation to the relative needs and costs of local governments this would clearly be an
improvement. In any case, it is always necessary to take into account the higher complexity that
comes with the gain in accuracy.

3. Per client (top-down) financial expenditure norms
This methodology follows a similar structure than the ―equal per capita expenditure norm‖
methodology, but improves the estimation of the expenditures needs by using more detailed
information about the expenditure functions assigned to the local governments, and devising a
local government functional allocation in a ―top-down‖ manner.

Its procedure can be

summarized as follows:

Step 1: To determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN) and the
aggregate level of expenditures needs per function j of sub-national governments
(SENj).
As mentioned before, the SEN can be based on adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast.
The same is true for functional expenditures needs, which must refer to the expenditure
responsibilities assigned by law to the local governments. Alternatively, the functional budget
forecast can incorporate adjustments responding to changes in expenditure priorities, but of
course in the overall the adjustments must balance in order to fit the SEN.

Step 2: To compute the per client expenditure norm for each function j, dividing SENj by the
number of clients or users that the function j has at a national level, Cj.
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For instance, if we are referring the sub-national expenditures in secondary education, then the
number of secondary students in the country will become the number of clients, and the norm
will be obtained by dividing SENj by this number.
It is clear that this method requires the existence of demographic data for all jurisdictions, as well
as a functional classification of expenditures that is not always available for sub-national
governments. In this context, some gains in feasibility can be obtained by simplifying the
procedure; either considering only the most important sub-national functions, or grouping the
functions that have the same type of clients. For instance, if the administrative costs cannot be
assigned to specific functions, and there are also some rather unimportant functions classified as
―other expenditures,‖ then it will be convenient to add them up and divide the result by the
population, which in these particular cases would represent a good proxy of the number of
clients.

Given a certain number of clients, once the funding envelope for any category has been
determined then, the per client norm has been implicitly defined. Accordingly, the amount of
money per capita or per client in the norm can be decided in an ad hoc manner by line ministries
or even stated in the law for several years or changed every year. However, the problem with this
approach is that either the norms may not be affordable or may be too little; thus, in order to
ensure the feasibility of the norms, the best practice within this approach is to first subdivide
from the top (according to the expenditure priorities of the central authorities) the available
funding envelope for local governments in all the expenditure functions or categories, as
recommended in the ―first step.‖

Step 3: To compute the per capita equivalent need of all per client functional norms
(determined in the second step) for all jurisdictions.

This step is necessary because the formula of fiscal disparities is defined at a jurisdictional level
and expressed in per capita units, and so all the elements to be incorporated must be defined in
identical terms. The computation consists in multiplying the per client functional norm defined at

66

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

the national level (SENj / Cj) by the ratio between the number of clients of that function in each
locality and its population (Cj i / Pi). The reasoning involved is very simple: If, for instance, in
certain jurisdiction with a population of 9 inhabitants the number of clients of the function j is 3
(so the clients correspond to one third of the population), then a per client need of, let say L$6
million, is perfectly equivalent to a per capita need of L$2 million (one third of the per client
need) within the jurisdiction.

Either in the step 2 or 3, the per capita equivalent need of each category of expenditures can be
adjusted upwards or downwards in order to reflect differences in the costs of provision across
jurisdictions. Again, this must be done in such a way that the overall budget affordability of the
norm is not affected.

Step 4: To compute the per capita expenditure need of each jurisdiction j by adding up its per
capita equivalent needs for all categories.

If we are considering three functional categories of expenditures (j = 1, 2 or 3), once the SENj
has been determined as in the first step of the procedure, the three remaining steps can be
summarized in the following expression:

EN i 

SEN1 C1i SEN 2 C2 i SEN 3 C3i





C1
Pi
C2
Pi
C3
Pi

Due to several positive features, this methodology constitutes a very attractive alternative for the
design of an intergovernmental transfer system. Because of its structure, the per client financial
expenditure norms‘ methodology is able to define feasible national norms that are also flexible
enough to be adjusted in response to changes in national public policy, to consider differences in
cost provision across jurisdictions, and also to adapt to limited available information.
Additionally, the estimation of expenditures needs is explicitly linked with the functions of the
sub-national governments, which is the correct approach to measuring expenditures needs.
Finally, its simplicity contributes to the transparency of the system and the predictability of the
amount of transfers to be received by the local governments.
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The main drawback of the methodology is its dependence on the selected expenditure norms. A
careful and rational determination of the national expenditures norms (or the available funding
envelope for each category) is in this case crucial for the success of the intergovernmental
transfer system, because deviations from the actual expenditure needs can importantly affect its
equalizing effects. In this regard, the historical averages of per client expenditures by function
can provide a natural reference of magnitude, and each expenditure norm can be adjusted
upwards or downwards with caution, considering both the national priorities and the effects on
the available funding envelope, such that the remaining functional norms do not result
underestimated or overestimated.

4. Weighted indexes of expenditure needs
This is perhaps the most commonly used approach for estimating expenditure needs. 32 It roughly
consists in creating a composite index of expenditure needs, which captures and weights the
factors determining the cost differences in delivering a standard package of local government
services across jurisdictions. Such factors include demographic variables reflecting, for example,
the special needs of the young and the elderly, other factors such as the level of poverty and
unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. The list of criteria entering the
index and the weight used need to be carefully assessed and also thoroughly discussed with all
stakeholders to ensure that the main causes for substantial differences in the costs of public
service delivery across jurisdictions are captured in the index.

The methodology for computing the weighted index and the per capita expenditure needs is
conceptually simple, but it requires several steps that are better explained sequentially:

Step 1: To determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN.)

Step 2: To select the variables or factors explaining the cost differences in delivering a standard
package of local government services.

32

This approach is implicitly applied when a weighted-factor mechanism is used for allocating equalization grants.
In this case, however, we clearly restrict its usage to estimating expenditure needs, while in practice the weightedfactor formulas are usually not very transparent in separating expenditure needs from fiscal capacity.
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Step 3: To compute the indexes representing the relative expenditure need of each and every
jurisdiction, for each and every selected variable:
n

ri k  Fi k /  Fi k ,
i 1

where Fi k is the value of the variable k for the jurisdiction i, n the number of
jurisdictions, and thus ri k the index of relative expenditure need of jurisdiction i
according to the values of the variable k.

Step 4: To establish the weights or the relative importance of the selected factors in the
determination of expenditure needs, a k , which are identical for all jurisdictions, such
that:
m

a

k

 1 , where m is the number of factors.

k 1

Step 5: To compute the composite index of expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i ( IEN i ):
m

IEN i   a k  ri k .
k 1

Step 6: To compute the expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i:

EN i  IEN i  SEN .

The effectiveness of this methodology in estimating expenditure needs depends critically on the
choice of the factors and their weights. Objective choices of factors and weights capturing the
variation in expenditure needs can be made by using simple statistical techniques. The factors are
those explaining the differences in expenditure needs and the weights represent the relative
contribution of each factor to the overall measure of need. In practice, however, the data required
to objectively select the factors and estimate their proper weights is not always available, and
these decisions, clearly subject to political pressure, are made in an arbitrary and obscure
manner.
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Local government officials and parliamentarians have incentives to fight for the inclusion of
those factors that favor their own constituencies, or for weighting them more heavily, so if the
analysis is not based on objective information, the political process can easily result in a formula
that do not estimate expenditures needs properly. There also exist a tendency for policy makers
to ―over-design‖ the measure of expenditure needs by including too many factors, adding
complexity and reducing transparency in the allocation scheme. In reality, the inclusion of more
factors does not necessarily represent a gain in accuracy, because they are usually correlated and
thus no new information is effectively added.

Therefore, a balance has to be struck between simplicity and transparency, and it is necessary to
find factors that equitably reflect the true fiscal need of local governments. Variables used as
factors should more accurately reflect needs, come from an independent source, and be free of
manipulation by either central government or sub-national governments.

5. Traditional (bottom-up) physical expenditure norms
Expenditure needs can also be measured in a bottom-up manner, by exhaustively costing a
standardized basket of local government services. In addition to the determination of standard
levels of public services (national averages or minimum requirements), this approach requires a
detailed quantification of the inputs, information about their cost or prices, a description of the
production process for all local public goods and services, and very explicit procedures for how
to cost all aspects of the expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments. The
expenditure needs for each local government are obtained by simply adding up all the costs of
delivering the targeted standards associated with the sub-national services within the jurisdiction.

Although intuitively appealing, the traditional approach is usually unrealistic due to the
impossibility of gathering all the information it requires. Collecting and managing all the
information could be very demanding in terms of effort and extremely expensive. Finally, this
approach may also be impractical because it can lead to unaffordable estimations of expenditure
needs, forcing to adjust downwards the computed expenditure needs.
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These important drawbacks explain why the international practice has consistently moved
toward alternative approaches in expenditure needs‘ estimation during the last decades.33 In
particular, the ―top-down‖ approach already explained can be regarded as the most adequate and
suitable whenever the information available at the sub-national level is limited; while other
statistically based approaches can provide ―ideal‖ estimations of local expenditure needs when
the data is detailed and abundant enough to do so. One example of the latter approach is the
Representative Expenditure System, methodology that will be explained in the following point.

6. Regression-based representative expenditure system (RES)
Among the methodologies presented here for measuring expenditure needs, this is the most
sophisticated and conceptually complex one. It is data intensive, and thus not suitable to be
applied in all countries, but it offers a very good estimation of expenditure needs and so it is
worth it to be explained briefly.

Step 1: To select, among the expenditures responsibilities of sub-national governments, those
functions or categories that will be subject to equalization.

Step 2: To identify the main factors, other than the prices of inputs, determining the cost of
providing local services for each of the selected functions. This can be done through a
regression analyses in which the explained or dependent variables are the actual
expenditures incurred in each functions and the explanatory or independent variables
are those that would explain the differences in the cost of providing public services
across jurisdictions. The relevant factors will be those that are statistically significant
and have a relevant impact in the costs of public service provision.

Step 3: To compute the per capita representative expenditures for each function and each
locality by using the coefficients obtained in step 2. The representative expenditures
can be interpreted as the amount of money that a local government would have spent in
some category if it had provided the standard level of service.
33

Only few countries, most of them developed, have the capacity to deal adequately with highly detailed
expenditure norms. Examples of countries currently using this ―bottom-up‖ approach are Denmark, the Netherlands
and Japan.
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Step 4: To adjust the per capita representative expenditures by considering the input prices.

Step 5: To sum the adjusted per capita representative expenditures of all categories to arrive to
the total per capita representative expenditures.

The representative revenue system is technically considered as the best approach to estimate
expenditure needs, so it can be recommended whenever its application is feasible. However, the
procedure is data intensive and it is usually not possible, or too expensive, to collect the all
detailed information required for the proper use of this model.

Appendix 3. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Fiscal Capacity34

Fiscal capacity of a sub-national government may be defined as the potential revenues that can
be obtained from the tax bases assigned to the sub-national government if an average level of
effort (by national standards) is applied to those tax bases. Thus, ideally, the measure of fiscal
capacity should consider either the size of the tax bases available to sub-national governments or
the revenue that these tax bases would yield under standard tax rates.
A variety of methods are used around the world to measure local government‘s fiscal capacity,
four of which are going to be presented here.

1. Lagged own revenue collections
The lagged or historical level of revenue collections constitutes a very simple way to define the
fiscal capacity of the jurisdictions. Unfortunately, using past collections does not satisfactorily
address the problem of negative incentives, because sub-national governments can easily ―learn‖
that higher collections translate into lower transfers and consequently reduce their tax effort in
order to take advantage of the transfer system.

34

See again Gomez et a. (2007) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
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Another important problem with this approach is the existence of a difference or gap (sometimes
large) between actual and potential collections in any jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the size
of these gaps also vary across jurisdictions. There are several causes for these gaps to arise. One
cause could be some differences on the tax structure or in the definition of the tax base across
jurisdictions. For instance, they could compute the taxable income in a different way or have
dissimilar criteria for tax exemptions. In both cases, the tax collection will likely differ between
similar jurisdictions, even in the case where their fiscal capacity is identical. Similarly, tax
avoidance and tax evasion might affect some local governments more than others, and the ability
to overcome these problems, including the costs that must be assumed in order to improve the
compliance rates, may also vary across jurisdictions.

In general, using the actual amount of revenue collections in a jurisdiction as a measure of fiscal
capacity should be avoided if local authorities can control tax rates, tax base, or administrative
enforcement effort. In such a case, some local governments would be able to reduce the actual
collections (in exchange, for example, of political benefits) and benefit in an undesirable way
from the equalization transfer system. This kind of practices could seriously damage the
equalizing effects of the program.

Due to these complications, and the similar shortcomings presented by the lagged expenditure
values in estimating expenditure needs, the direct application of historical data in estimating the
fiscal disparities should in general be avoided. As an alternative, the same as in the case of
expenditure needs‘ estimation, simple manipulation of the available historical data can serve to
reduce the problems related with perverse incentives and the differences between actual
collections and ―true‖ fiscal capacity. The following methodology is an example of this strategy.

2. Average of past collection ratios
In order to reduce the problems related with the use of lagged own revenue collections in
estimating fiscal capacity, some slight manipulations of historical collection can provide
effective and straightforward solutions.
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The present methodology roughly consists in computing the ratio between local per capita
revenues and the per capita revenues at the national level for several years, and then to obtain an
average of these ratios for each jurisdiction, which indicates the relative size of local per capita
collections with respect to the national standard in a period of several years. Thus, a single
estimator of relative fiscal capacity is obtained for each jurisdiction and considering only
historical collection data. As we will explain, there are important potential advantages in using
historical data in this rather indirect way. The complete procedure can be summarized in the
following six steps:

Step 1: To select, among all sources of revenues, those that can be used to represent the fiscal
capacity of local governments.

If fiscal capacity is understood as the revenues that a local government would rise by applying
standard tax rates to their tax bases, then it is natural to consider the own taxes applied by the
local government within its jurisdiction as the most important source of revenues. However,
since what matters is to measure the ability of local government to cover its expenditure needs, it
is also necessary to include those received as revenue sharing from the central government and
all intergovernmental transfers exempting only equalization transfers. Again, in order to avoid
undesirable manipulation, it is desirable that no discretion is allowed by central or local
government officials in the determination of the tax rates or the composition of the tax base on
these sources of revenue.

Step 2: To define the historical periods that can serve better as a reference for estimating future
fiscal capacity.

The more the periods considered, the lower the possibility of undesirable manipulation of the
index created for estimating future fiscal capacity. However, the use of very old collection data
can be misleading if many changes have taken place in the collection patterns of local
governments during the last years. For these reasons, periods of three, four or five years,
depending on data availability and current relevancy of the information, could be a plausible
choice.
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Step 3: To compute the per capita revenue for each jurisdiction i and for each period t (Rjt), as
well as the per capita revenue at a national level for every year (RNt).
Defining Pit and PNt as the population in jurisdiction i and the national population in period t,
respectively, then the per capita revenues for each revenue source j, jurisdiction i and period t are
defined as

Ri j t 

revenues for i, from source jt
Pi t

, and

RN j t 

total revenues, source jt
.
PN t

Furthermore, the total per capita revenues at jurisdictional and national level in each period are
given by Ri t   j Ri j t and RN t   j RN j t , respectively.

Step 4: To compute the relative collection ratios, for every jurisdiction i and period t (RCRit),
which are obtained for every year by dividing the per capita revenues of jurisdiction i
by the national per capita revenues: RCRit  Ri t RN t .

The relative collection ratios can be lower, equal or higher than one, meaning that the
jurisdiction have collected less, the same or more per capita revenues than the country as a whole
during a certain year.

Step 5: To compute the index of relative collection for each jurisdiction (IRCi), as the average
of all relative collection ratios of the jurisdiction. Defining T as the number of periods
selected for the estimation, then IRCi  t RCRi t T .

The index of relative collection has exactly the same interpretation than the relative collection
ratios, but it refers to a longer period of time. This last characteristic helps to moderate the
perverse incentives associated with the benefits of reducing tax collections, because now, if a
local government wants to increase the amount of future transfers, it must modify a multi-year
average instead of a single-year result. Indeed, the expected benefits of reducing the local tax
collections are decreased in proportion to the number of periods used in the computation of the
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average, and so the perverse incentives are directly reduced as well. Additionally, if the local
government officials are not sure whether they will remain in their positions during the following
years or not, then the idea of beneficiating competing political parties in the future can also
discourage that behavior. If present, this ―democratic factor‖ could eventually increase the
effectiveness of this methodology.

Step 6: To estimate the per capita fiscal capacity for all jurisdictions as:

FCi  IRCi  aggregate revenue forecast

This estimation of fiscal capacity can be interpreted as the fiscal capacity that the local
government i would have in the forecasted period if the average tax collection at the local and
national level remain unchanged and the macroeconomic expectations are fulfilled.

3. Basic proxies for the local ability to tax
A different approach to estimating the fiscal capacity of sub-national governments is by
considering proxies, or variables that in theory should be highly correlated with their ability to
collect revenues. A widely used variable is the per capita level of personal income, which tends
to be a good proxy and is usually available. Another commonly used variable is the gross
regional product (GRP), which is the sub-national equivalent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and can also serve as a proxy of fiscal capacity. GRP is actually a more comprehensive measure
of fiscal capacity than per capita income because it includes all the income generated within a
region, personal and corporate, irrespective of the location of residence of the worker or
producer.

In order to improve the estimation of fiscal capacity, it is also possible to exclude from the GRP
certain items such as central taxes and transfers, which are not part of the potential tax base. The
resulting modified version of the GRP is referred as Total Taxable Resources (TTR), and it
constitutes a very good estimator of fiscal capacity.
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4. Representative Revenue System (RRS)
The basic idea underlying the RRS is to calculate the amount of revenue that a region would
collect if it were to exert average fiscal effort. This is done by collecting data on revenue
collections and tax bases for each tax under consideration and for every sub-national region.
Based upon information on all tax bases for every region as well as the national average fiscal
effort for each of the taxes, one can compute the amount of revenues that each jurisdiction would
collect under average fiscal effort. This amount is then considered to quantify the fiscal capacity
of each jurisdiction.

The RRS is a thorough and complete method to accurately measure the fiscal capacity of a
region. It is based on disaggregated data and a detailed knowledge of (proxies for) the statutory
tax bases, taking into account variations in effective tax rates among various tax components and
non-tax revenue sources. As a result, fiscal capacity as measured by the RRS can be considered
as an accurate representation of a region‘s true fiscal capacity. However, due to the
disaggregated nature of the information, the measure is data-intensive and is not always possible
to use it.
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Poverty
Population

Fiscal Capacity

Proportion of
Population

Proportion of
land area

Proportion of
Young
Population

Proportion of
Old Population

Proportion of
poverty
population

(5)

(6)a

(7)=
(1)/sum(1)

(8)=
(2)/sum(2)

(9) =
(3)/sum(3)

(10) =
(4)/sum(4)

(11) =
(5)/sum(5)

Region I Ilocos Norte
547284
3504.3
54789
39055
11923 1178.15 0.0080
Region I Ilocos Sur
633138 2595.96
65759
45106
17238
989.65 0.0092
Region I La Union
720972 1503.75
75822
42327
35618
818.88 0.0105
Region I Pangasinan
2.65E+06 5451.01 307465 138257 114400
632.97 0.0386
…
CAR
Abra
230953
4198.2
26739
15529
15182 2438.18 0.0034
CAR
Apayao
103633 4351.23
12865
4663
8463 3853.51 0.0015
CAR
Benguet
372533 2769.08
41508
14639
5992 1909.24 0.0054
CAR
Ifugao
180815 2628.21
21008
8012
7716 2195.43 0.0026
CAR
Kalinga
182326 3231.25
22948
8092
7314 2066.59 0.0027
CAR
Mt. Province
148661 2157.38
18489
9467
10280 2325.84 0.0022
Source: Own calculation.
a: Fiscal capacity is computed by the average of past collection ratios method (FC1).
b: (12)=[max(12)-(12)]/{N*[max(12)-average(12)]}, where N is the number of provinces.
b:(13)=0.35*(7)+0.1*(8) +0.1*(9)+ 0.1*(10) +0.1*(11) +0.25*(12).
c: (14)=[(13)*total available FEEP for provinces]/(1).

0.0108
0.0080
0.0046
0.0167

0.0065
0.0078
0.0090
0.0364

0.0129
0.0149
0.0140
0.0456

0.0032
0.0046
0.0094
0.0303

(12)b

FEEP transfer
per capita in
PhP

Old Population
(4)

Weighted
Index (%)

Young
Population
(3)

Relative fiscal
capacity

Land Area
2008
(2)

province

(1)

Region

Population
2008

Appendix 4. Computation of per capita FEEP transfers by adjusted weighted index formula in the IRA for provinces

(13)c

(14)d

0.0127
0.0130
0.0132
0.0134

0.0093
0.0100
0.0107
0.0298

261.41
242.71
227.66
172.97

0.0129
0.0134
0.0085
0.0081
0.0099
0.0066

0.0032
0.0015
0.0049
0.0025
0.0027
0.0022

0.0051
0.0015
0.0048
0.0026
0.0027
0.0031

0.0040
0.0022
0.0016
0.0020
0.0019
0.0027

0.0111
0.0093
0.0118
0.0114
0.0116
0.0113

0.0065
0.0047
0.0068
0.0053
0.0056
0.0050

431.31
700.67
282.04
451.08
468.36
521.29
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Appendix 5. Computation of per capita expenditure needs by expenditure norms (EN1) for provinces

Economic services

20953.9

2315.6

9033.9

30.2

827.7

973

9900.8

1594.4

10519.2

Aggregate clients (Thousands)

686071

575242.4

206819.9

360508.3

37812.1

30308.2

686071

686071

686071

305.4

40.3

436.8

0.8

218.9

321.0

144.3

23.2

153.3

Region

Expenditure norm

(1)

(7)…(15)=expenditure norm * number of clients/total population

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Region I

Ilocos Norte

547284

452289

165533

310260

11923

39055

305.42

33.27

132.12

0.47

Region I

Ilocos Sur

633138

520984

192889

350452

17238

45106

305.42

33.12

133.07

Region I

La Union

720972

601508

214821

400487

35618

42327

305.42

33.58

130.15

Region I

Pangasinan

2.60E+06

2196819

795941

1395381

114400

138257

305.42

33.43

(7)++…+(15
)

Aggregate expenditure (Million)

Province

Other purposes

EN1
Debt servicing

Social security/social service and
welfare

Housing and community
development

Labor and employment

Health, nutrition and population
control

Education, culture and sports

General public services

Population over 65 years: Social
security and welfare

Poverty population: Housing and
community development

Population between 18-65 years:
labor and employment

Equivalent per capita need

A weighted population: health,
nutrition and population control

Population between 4-65 years:
Education, culture and sport

Total population: general public
service; economic services; debt
servicing ; other purposes

Number of clients

4.77

22.91

144.31

23.24

153.32

819.83

0.46

5.96

22.87

144.31

23.24

153.32

821.78

0.46

10.81

18.85

144.31

23.24

153.32

820.15

131.42

0.44

9.47

16.78

144.31

23.24

153.32

817.83

…
CAR

Abra

230953

188026

71420

121812

15182

15529

305.42

32.77

135.08

0.44

14.39

21.59

144.31

23.24

153.32

830.56

CAR

Apayao

103633

86037

31230

54473

8463

4663

305.42

33.42

131.63

0.44

17.88

14.44

144.31

23.24

153.32

824.10

CAR

Benguet

372533

314799

107877

206660

5992

14639

305.42

34.02

126.49

0.46

3.52

12.62

144.31

23.24

153.32

803.40

CAR

Ifugao

180815

151577

53531

94155

7716

8012

305.42

33.74

129.32

0.44

9.34

14.22

144.31

23.24

153.32

813.36

CAR

Kalinga

182326

151058

55044

92441

7314

8092

305.42

33.35

131.87

0.42

8.78

14.25

144.31

23.24

153.32

814.96

CAR

Mt. Province

148661

120283

46421

73366

10280

9467

305.42

32.57

136.40

0.41

15.14

20.44

144.31

23.24

153.32

831.25

Source: Own calculation.
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Proportion of
land area

Proportion of
Young
Population

Proportion of Old
Population

Proportion of
poverty
population

(7)=
(2)/sum(2)

(8) =
(3)/sum(3)

(9) =
(4)/sum(4)

(10) =
(5)/sum(5)

0.0129
0.0149
0.0140
0.0456

0.0032
0.0046
0.0094
0.0303

0.0082
0.0090
0.0098
0.0348

839.77
795.71
759.45
738.21

15529
4663
14639
8012
8092
9467

15182
8463
5992
7716
7314
10280

0.0034
0.0015
0.0054
0.0026
0.0027
0.0022

0.0129
0.0134
0.0085
0.0081
0.0099
0.0066

0.0032
0.0015
0.0049
0.0025
0.0027
0.0022

0.0051
0.0015
0.0048
0.0026
0.0027
0.0031

0.0040
0.0022
0.0016
0.0020
0.0019
0.0027

0.0051
0.0034
0.0051
0.0033
0.0037
0.0031

1246.52
1844.61
775.90
1037.59
1124.21
1157.96

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Region I Ilocos Norte
547284
3504.3
54789
Region I Ilocos Sur
633138 2595.96
65759
Region I La Union
720972 1503.75
75822
Region I Pangasinan
2.60E+06 5451.01 307465
…
CAR
Abra
230953
4198.2
26739
CAR
Apayao
103633 4351.23
12865
CAR
Benguet
372533 2769.08
41508
CAR
Ifugao
180815 2628.21
21008
CAR
Kalinga
182326 3231.25
22948
CAR
Mt. Province
148661 2157.38
18489
Source: Own calculation.
a: (11)=0.4*(6)+0.15*(7) +0.15*(8)+ 0.15*(9) +0.15*(10) .
b: (12)=[(11)*Aggregate expenditure needs for provinces]/(1).

Weighted Index
(%)

Proportion of
Population
(6)=
(1)/sum(1)

0.0065
0.0078
0.0090
0.0364

Poverty
Population

0.0108
0.0080
0.0046
0.0167

Old Population

0.0080
0.0092
0.0105
0.0386

Young
Population

11923
17238
35618
114400

Land Area 2008

39055
45106
42327
138257

Population 2008

province

Region

Appendix 6: Computation of per capita expenditure needs by weighted index formula (EN2) for provinces

(11)a

EN2

(12)b

80

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Appendix 7: Computation of per capita fiscal capacity according to the average of past collection ratios (FC1) for provinces
Own revenues

Region

Province

2006

2007

2008

Total
populat
ion

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)=
[(1)/sum(1)+(2)/sum(2)+(3)/sum(3)
]/3

Relative fiscal capacity
(three years average)

Estimated own revenues
(6)=(5)* Aggregate forecast of total
collection

Other
revenuesa

FC1

(7)

[(6)+(7)]/(4)

Region I

Ilocos Norte

77356752

108695952

92351480

547284

0.0107

1.05E+08

539783808

1178.15

Region I

Ilocos Sur

20831182

41236792

53646624

633138

0.0043

42399980

584188032

989.65

Region I

La Union

61574848

61154420

70983048

720972

0.0074

73129216

517261952

818.88

Region I

Pangasinan

196064336

277683264

227151808

2645395

0.0269

2.65E+08

1409807616

632.97

CAR

Abra

23107566

27399410

26263748

230953

0.0030

29004076

534100864

2438.18

CAR

Apayao

2268535.5

2356469.25

5290131.5

103633

0.0004

3625051

395726048

3853.51

CAR

Benguet

147329360

171195008

205977840

372533

0.0200

1.96E+08

514814784

1909.24

CAR

Ifugao

16102927

46683580

87096672

180815

0.0055

53592896

343372960

2195.43

CAR

Kalinga
Mt.
Province

15263204

17097756

17325910

182326

0.0019

18771798

358020480

2066.59

23072496

26786104

31963782

148661

0.0031

30656818

315104256

2325.84

…

CAR

a: other revenues include share from national tax collection, extraordinary receipts aids, loans and borrowings, and inter-local transfers in the fiscal year of 2008.
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Appendix 8: Computation of relative fiscal gap for provinces (taking fiscal capacity measure 1 as an example)
Region

Province

Region I
Ilocos Norte
Region I
Ilocos Sur
Region I
La Union
Region I
Pangasinan
…
CAR
Abra
CAR
Apayao
CAR
Benguet
CAR
Ifugao
CAR
Kalinga
CAR
Mt. Province
Source: Own calculation

(1)
819.83
821.78
820.15
817.83

Per capita fiscal capacity by
the average of past collection
ratios (FC1)
(2)
1178.15
989.65
818.88
632.97

830.56
824.10
803.40
813.36
814.96
831.25

2438.18
3853.51
1909.24
2195.43
2066.59
2325.84

Per capita expenditure needs by
Expenditure norms (EN1)

Fiscal gap measure 1

Relative fiscal gap measure1

(3)=(1)-(2)
-358.33
-167.87
1.27
184.86

(4)=(3)/sum(3)
0.01112
0.00521
-0.00004
-0.00574

-1607.62
-3029.41
-1105.85
-1382.07
-1251.62
-1494.58

0.04989
0.09401
0.03432
0.04289
0.03884
0.04638

